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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF MENDOCINO

VINCENT MICHAEL HYLER, Petitioner, v. CARLI MICHELLE HELLER, Respondent. Minor child: J.J.H.	Case No. 25FL01030 (consolidated with 25FL01032) **SECOND VERIFIED STATEMENT OF DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE FREDRICCO McCURRY, ON FACTS ARISING AFTER THE AUGUST 31, 2026 STATEMENT** (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 170.1, subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii); 170.3, subd. (c); 170.4, subds. (c)(3), (d)) Hearing set: November 4, 2026, 9:30 a.m., Dept. C Hon. FredRicco McCurry

I. Introduction

1. Respondent Carli Michelle Heller, appearing in propria persona, files this second verified statement of disqualification and objects to any further hearing or trial in this matter before Judge FredRicco McCurry, including the hearing set for November 4, 2026 at 9:30 a.m. in Department C and the hearing on Petitioner's request for attorney's fees served October 27, 2026.

2. Respondent's first statement was filed August 31, 2026. Judge McCurry struck it himself on September 10, 2026 under section 170.4, subdivision (b), filing a verified answer "in the alternative." (Exh. 2.) Section 170.4, subdivision (c)(3) permits a further statement where "facts suggesting new grounds for disqualification are first learned of or arise after the first statement of disqualification was filed." Every fact on which this statement rests arose after August 31, 2026: September 15, October 6, October 14, October 15, and October 27, 2026. None of them was, or could have been, before the court on September 10.

3. This statement rests on the four corners of the court's own record: the clerk's minutes, the court's signed orders, and the sworn declaration and brief of Petitioner's counsel. Respondent does not ask the judge who decides this question to relitigate any factual dispute. She asks only whether, on that record, a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that Judge McCurry would be able to be impartial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii).)

II. The standard, in the words the court itself used on September 10

4. The test is objective: "whether a reasonable member of the public at large, aware of all the facts, would fairly entertain doubts concerning the judge's impartiality." (*Briggs v. Superior Court* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 312, 319, quoted in the court's September 10 order, Exh. 2, p. 5.) The reasonable person is "a well-informed, thoughtful observer." (*Wechsler v. Superior Court* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 384, 391, quoted at Exh. 2, p. 5.)

5. The September 10 order held that rulings on contested legal questions are not grounds for disqualification and that the remedy for an erroneous ruling "was to file an appeal or writ petition." (Exh. 2, p. 6.) Respondent took that remedy. On October 18–19, 2026 she petitioned the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the October 15, 2026 order, with an application for immediate stay (No. A177840, pending). This statement does not ask anyone to decide whether the October 15 order is legally wrong. It concerns what the court did to its own record, and to whom, and when.

6. Section 170.3, subdivision (c)(5) provides that a judge who refuses to recuse "shall not pass upon his or her own disqualification or upon the sufficiency in law, fact, or otherwise, of the statement." Section 170.4, subdivision (d) provides that after the filing of a statement of disqualification the judge "shall have no power to act in any proceeding … until the question of his or her disqualification has been determined," subject to the acts subdivision (a) permits and to subdivision (c), which governs statements filed during a trial or hearing already begun. The judge may strike a statement only as subdivision (b) provides: one "untimely filed" or one that "on its face … discloses no legal grounds." Part V addresses timeliness. Parts III and IV address the grounds.

III. Facts, in the order they happened

Record citations are to the record filed in the First Appellate District in No. A177840 (Supporting Documents, Tabs A–P), copies of which are attached as exhibits here. Each fact below is a document the court or Petitioner's counsel wrote, or Respondent's own sworn statement filed in this court.

September 2, 2026 — the hearing at which the August 12 order expired by its printed terms.

7. The clerk's minutes of September 2, 2026 record that the court noted Respondent's August 31 challenge under sections 170.1 and 170.3 and "must respond to this challenge, which will not occur this morning"; that "[t]he Court states the matter will be continued"; that "[b]oth the Motion and the Order to Show Cause are continued to September 15, 2026, at 9:30 a.m. in Department 'C'"; and that "[t]he pending ex parte will be deferred to Judge Pekin pending recusal." (Exh. 1, record p. 56.)

8. The minutes record no order extending the August 12, 2026 temporary emergency orders. (Exh. 1.)

September 10, 2026 — the court strikes the first statement.

9. On September 10, 2026 Judge McCurry signed an "Order Striking Respondent's 'Verified Statement of Disqualification and Motion to Disqualify Judge McCurry for Cause;' in the Alternative, Verified Answer of Judge FredRicco McCurry." (Exh. 2.) The order states that the February 11, 2026 Findings and Order After Hearing "contained the standing orders for the parties to follow." (Exh. 2, p. 2; verified answer ¶ 5, p. 8.)

September 15, 2026 — an extension stated on no motion and reduced to no writing.

10. On September 15, 2026, at the continued hearing, Petitioner's counsel stated that the August 12 orders were extended to the date of the evidentiary hearing. No motion to extend them was before the court. Respondent objected on the record: "I do not believe that that could be extended." (Exh. 3, record p. 200 [Heller Decl., ¶ 6]; record p. 252 [Heller Decl., ¶ 13].) The court assented orally. No written order followed, and Respondent has received none. (Ibid.)

September 28 – October 6, 2026 — Respondent's enforcement petition is filed and not set.

11. On September 28, 2026 Respondent filed a verified Petition for Enforcement of the February 11, 2026 order under Family Code section 3448, with a proposed order to appear. (Record pp. 59–67, 186–187.) Section 3448, subdivision (c) provides that "[u]pon the filing of a petition, the court shall issue an order directing the respondent to appear in person with or without the child at a hearing," to be held "on the next judicial day after service of the order unless that date is impossible." No order to appear issued.

12. On October 6, 2026 the court stated that Respondent's petitions were "filed as petitions, so they've not been calendared as … a motion or request for order," and that it would set dates the next day. (Exh. 3, record p. 200 [¶ 7].) It set none.

October 6, 2026 — a conditional, oral, nunc pro tunc extension.

13. On October 6, 2026 the court spoke to the August 12 orders. Petitioner's counsel's brief describes the statement: "The Court stated on the record, that if the order had not been extended on September 2, it was extending it nunc pro tunc, until at least August 7 [sic], 2026, the day that the Contempt hearing was set for." (Exh. 4, record p. 293 [p. 2:24–26].) Counsel's declaration describes the same event: the court "orally ordered on the record that all temporary orders remain in effect." (Exh. 4, record p. 300 [¶¶ 2–3].) Respondent's sworn account is the same: if the order had not been extended on September 2, the court was extending it nunc pro tunc at least until October 7 and would address the matter again; counsel offered to submit a written order; Respondent objected that the order had expired September 2; the court noted the objection. (Exh. 3, record p. 200 [¶ 7]; record p. 252 [¶ 14].) No written order issued.

14. A court that understood itself to have extended the orders on September 15 through the evidentiary hearing would have had little occasion on October 6 to extend them "if" they had not been extended on September 2.

October 14, 2026 — Respondent asks for the order to appear and for her son's return; Petitioner's counsel swears only to October 6.

15. On October 14, 2026 Respondent gave notice of, served, and filed at the counter an ex parte request for the order to appear under section 3448, subdivision (c) and for the child's return under the February 11 order, with a memorandum, declaration, and exhibits (record pp. 189–240), and a written Objection to Any Extension of the Expired August 12, 2026 Order, Including Nunc Pro Tunc, with memorandum and declaration (record pp. 242–290). (Exh. 5.)

16. The same day Petitioner opposed with a two-page declaration of counsel and a proposed order. (Exh. 4, record pp. 292–301.) The declaration attests to one event: that on October 6 the court "orally ordered on the record that all temporary orders remain in effect." (Record p. 300 [¶¶ 2–3].) It says nothing about September 15.

17. The declaration states, under penalty of perjury, that counsel "does not request that the Court record an extension as having been made on a date when no such ruling occurred." (Record p. 300 [¶ 4].)

18. The opposition brief states: "A court may correct its record to reflect the order actually made; it may not create a different judicial decision retroactively." (Record p. 295 [p. 4:3–5].) It states: "Petitioner does not request an extension backdated to a date on which no extension was made." (Record p. 295 [p. 4:10].) It states: "Section 3448 provides for a verified enforcement petition and an order directing appearance, followed by a hearing on the next judicial day after service unless that date is impossible." (Record p. 295 [p. 4:12–14].)

October 15, 2026 — the court signs the proposed order without a hearing; it declares uninterrupted force and alters the minutes.

19. On October 15, 2026 Respondent submitted a reply, a supplemental declaration, a sworn supplemental memorandum that the child's occupational therapy and early-intervention services (three sessions a week) stopped on August 19, 2026 and that the Ukiah clinic, which had none of his Florida records, wrote a developmental-delay referral into his record on August 26, 2026, a Family Code section 3044 response, and a Request for Order. (Record pp. 308–365.)

20. That afternoon, without a hearing, the court signed Petitioner's proposed order. It was filed at 2:07 p.m. (Exh. 6, record pp. 303–304.) Petitioner's counsel's office e-mailed the signed order to Respondent at 2:56 p.m. the same day. (Exh. 6.)

21. The order recites: "On August 12, 2026, this Court issued Temporary Emergency (Ex Parte) Orders. At the hearing on September 2, 2026 the court continued the matter until Spetember 25, 2026 at Respondent's request. On September 15, 2026, in Department C, the Court extended the August 12 Orders pending the evidentiary hearing set for December 9, 2026. That ruling was not reflected in the minute order. The Court enters this order to confirm and memorialize its ruling."

22. It orders: "1. The August 12 Orders were extended by the Court at the continued hearing on September 15, 2026. 2. The August 12 Orders have remained in full force and effect without interruption since August 12, 2026, and remain in full force and effect through the

evidentiary hearing set for December 9, 2026, and until further order of the Court. 3. Every order contained in the August 12 Orders, including all orders in the FL-341(B) Child Abduction Prevention Order Attachment, remains in full force and effect without modification. 4. The minute order for September 15, 2026 is corrected to reflect the Court's ruling extending the August 12 Orders." (Exh. 6, record pp. 303–304.)

23. The words "nunc pro tunc" do not appear in the order. The child is not mentioned. No hearing was held. Counsel's sworn declaration of the day before described an extension made on October 6 and said nothing about September 15. The order fixes September 15 and declares the August 12 orders in force "without interruption since August 12," a period that includes September 2 through September 15, for which the minutes record no extension. (¶¶ 7–8, 16, 22.)

24. The order's recital that the September 2 matter was continued "at Respondent's request" is contradicted by the court's own September 2 minutes, which record a continuance to September 15 because the court itself "must respond to" Respondent's disqualification challenge. (Exh. 1, record p. 56.)

25. The same afternoon the court issued no order to appear on Respondent's section 3448 request. On the Request for Order she filed that day, the court ordered: "Request for temporary eme[r]gency o[r]der is denied," dated October 15, 2026, and the Notice of Hearing set the request for November 4, 2026 at 9:30 a.m. in Department C. (Exh. 7, record p. 306.) Respondent's sworn memorandum on the child's medical care was not addressed.

October 27, 2026 — a fee request against Respondent is set before the same judge.

26. On October 27, 2026 Petitioner served a Request for Order for attorney's fees and costs as sanctions against Respondent under Family Code section 271. The Request for Order was signed October 25 and filed October 26, 2026; its supporting memorandum is dated October 23, 2026 and requests $36,071.58. It is set for hearing before Judge McCurry in Department C. (Exh. 8.) Respondent's September 28 petition for enforcement remains without an order to appear.

IV. Grounds

Ground One. On October 15, without a hearing and over a written objection filed the day before, the court signed an order declaring the expired August 12 orders in force "without interruption," reciting a continuance its own minutes contradict, and directing its minutes altered.

27. The sequence is on the face of the court's own documents. The August 12 orders expired by their printed terms at the September 2 hearing, and the September 2 minutes record no extension. (¶¶ 7–8.) Thirteen days later an extension was stated from the lectern and assented to orally, on no motion, over objection. (¶ 10.) On October 6 the court said it was extending the orders "if" they had not been extended on September 2, and "until at least" the next day. (¶ 13.) On October 14 counsel's sworn declaration described only that October 6 ruling, and her brief

told the court that it "may not create a different judicial decision retroactively." (¶¶ 16–18.) On October 15 the court signed her proposed order declaring the orders in force "without interruption since August 12," reciting that the September 2 matter was continued "at Respondent's request," and directing that "[t]he minute order for September 15, 2026 is corrected." (¶¶ 21–22.) No hearing was held and no testimony was taken. Respondent's written objection to exactly this had been filed the day before. (¶ 15.)

28. This is not a ruling on a contested question of law, which the September 10 order correctly says is reviewed by writ, not disqualification. It is the court's treatment of its own record. The order declares uninterrupted force across a gap its own September 2 minutes leave open; it attributes to Respondent a continuance that those minutes attribute to the court's own need to answer her disqualification challenge; and it directs a minute order altered, without a hearing, over her written objection, on the opposing party's proposed form, the day after that party's counsel told the court it could not create a decision retroactively. A well-informed, thoughtful observer who read the September 2 minutes, the October 14 papers, and the October 15 order side by side might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge who did this would be able to be impartial toward the party whose objection he overrode to do it.

29. The observer would also note what the occasion was. Respondent had come to the court on October 14 asking it to perform the duty section 3448, subdivision (c) imposes on the filing of an enforcement petition: issue the order to appear, so that the matter is heard the next judicial day after the order is served. The court used that application as the occasion to sign the opposing party's order extending the taking of the child, denied Respondent's request for temporary emergency orders, and set the rest for a date three weeks out. (¶¶ 20, 25.) Petitioner's counsel's own brief, filed the day before, had conceded that section 3448 "provides for … an order directing appearance, followed by a hearing on the next judicial day." (¶ 18.) The court granted the opposing party an extension on a date her own declaration did not describe, and withheld the relief her own brief had conceded was mandatory. And it did so without the findings Family Code section 3044 requires before custody is awarded or continued to a parent against whom a finding of domestic violence exists. Respondent's section 3044 response was before the court that same day (¶ 19). Respondent brought two petitions for protection in Lee County, Florida (No. 26-DR-031429, Reichling, J., order setting hearing entered June 18, 2026; No. 26-DR-031586, Sloan, J.); on July 6, 2026 the court in the second entered a temporary injunction for protection against domestic violence, finding that it appears Respondent is a victim of domestic violence by Petitioner (Exh. 11, record pp. 320–332), and the restraining orders entered against Petitioner in 2025 are in this court's own file. Both Lee County cases were later dismissed without prejudice for nonappearance, never on the merits — the first because Respondent was ill, the second because her babysitter cancelled the night before; neither dismissal touched the finding already made. Not one of the orders of September 15, October 6, or October 15 applied the presumption or found it rebutted. The October 15 order continued custody in the party against whom the statute's rebuttable presumption runs — that such custody is detrimental to the child's best interest — in writing, without a word about it.

Ground Two. On September 15 the court extended an expired order orally, on no motion, over objection, and reduced nothing to writing.

30. No motion to extend the August 12 orders was before the court on September 15. Counsel stated the orders were extended; Respondent objected; the court assented orally; nothing was written, and the minutes did not record it. (¶¶ 10, 21.) Thirteen days earlier, at the hearing where the orders expired by their own printed terms, the court had made no extension and the minutes record none. (¶¶ 7–8; Exh. 9.) A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt about the impartiality of a judge who, five days after striking a statement of disqualification against himself, continued the opposing party's temporary custody of the child by assent to a statement from the lectern, with no motion, no finding, and no written order.

Ground Three. Petitioner's requests were granted within a day; Respondent's were denied the same afternoon or not acted on at all.

31. Petitioner's October 14 opposition and proposed order were signed October 15. (¶¶ 16, 20.) Respondent's September 28 verified petition for enforcement, on which the statute directs that an order to appear "shall issue" upon filing, received no order to appear on September 28, none on October 6 when the court said it would set dates the next day, none on October 15, and has none today. (¶¶ 11–12; Exh. 10.) Her separate request for her son's return was denied as to temporary emergency orders the same afternoon the opposing party's extension was signed, and the rest was set for November 4, three weeks out. (¶ 25.) Her sworn memorandum on his stopped therapy was not addressed. (¶ 25.) A thoughtful observer comparing the two columns would see one party's papers signed within twenty-four hours; the other party's emergency request denied the same afternoon; and her statutory petition still without the order the statute requires five weeks after filing.

Ground Four. The court is now set to hear a fee request against Respondent while her enforcement petition remains without an order to appear.

32. Petitioner's request for $36,071.58 in fees and sanctions from Respondent, served October 27, 2026, is set before Judge McCurry. (¶ 26.) The petition she filed September 28 to enforce the order the court itself called "the standing orders for the parties to follow" (¶ 9) still has no order to appear. Taken with Grounds One through Three, a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge who has issued no order to appear on her enforcement petition, and signed the extension over her objection, would be impartial in deciding whether she should pay the opposing party's fees for the same period.

The grounds taken together.

33. Each of Grounds One through Three stands alone. Taken together, they describe a court that, after striking a statement of disqualification against itself, extended the opposing party's temporary custody of the child orally and without writing; declined to set the mandatory hearing on Respondent's enforcement petition; and then, when Respondent came in writing to object to any retroactive extension and to ask for the hearing the statute requires, signed the opposing party's order declaring the expired orders in force without interruption, reciting a

continuance its own minutes contradict, and directing the minutes altered. This is not a series of adverse rulings. It is the court's treatment of its own record, and of the two parties before it, over six weeks.

V. Timeliness (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (c)(1))

34. A statement must be "presented at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the ground for disqualification." The facts here are:

35. Respondent received the signed October 15 order by e-mail from Petitioner's counsel's office at 2:56 p.m. on October 15, 2026. (Exh. 6.)

36. The court's September 10 order had instructed Respondent that the remedy for a ruling she believed erroneous "was to file an appeal or writ petition." (Exh. 2, p. 6.) Judge McCurry had struck her first statement himself and directed her to the writ; she followed that direction first. On October 16, 2026 she petitioned the Supreme Court for review in No. S299168. On October 18–19, 2026 she filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, with an application for immediate stay of the October 15 order, in the First Appellate District (No. A177840). On October 22, 2026 she filed a request for immediate ruling. Those petitions address the order. This statement addresses the judge.

37. On October 27, 2026 Petitioner served the fee request set before Judge McCurry. (¶ 26.) That is a new fact: a claim for money against Respondent, set before the same judge, while her enforcement petition still has no order to appear. Grounds Three and Four are not past events but continuing ones: on the day this statement is filed, the enforcement petition still has no order to appear, and the fee request against Respondent is set before the same judge.

38. The hearing of November 4, 2026 is the first hearing before Judge McCurry since the October 15 order. It was set on October 15, twenty days before the hearing date, so the deemed-commencement rule of section 170.4, subdivision (c)(2) (hearing set "30 or more days in advance") does not apply. This statement is filed before that hearing and is being personally served on the judge, or on his clerk while he is present in the courthouse or in chambers, before it.

39. On these facts the statement is presented at the earliest practicable opportunity. Any order striking it under section 170.4, subdivision (b) is reviewable only by writ of mandate within ten days of written notice of entry (§ 170.3, subd. (d)), in a Court of Appeal in which a petition concerning the October 15 order is already pending.

VI. The September 10 order's reasoning does not reach these grounds

40. The September 10 order rested on the rule that "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or partiality motion" (*Liteky v. United States* (1994) 510 U.S. 540, 555) and that a litigant's remedy for error is appeal or writ. (Exh. 2, pp. 6–7.) Respondent has taken the writ. The grounds here are of a different kind: the court's declaration of uninterrupted force across a gap its own minutes leave open; its recital of a continuance its minutes contradict; the oral extension of an expired order on no motion; and five weeks

without the order to appear on a petition carrying a statutory duty, while the opposing party's papers were signed within a day. *Liteky* itself excepts conduct that displays "a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." (510 U.S. at p. 555.) A well-informed observer who saw one party's papers signed the day after filing, with recitals the court's own minutes contradict, and the other party's statutory petition still without its order five weeks later, would not need to decide whether any single ruling was wrong to entertain a doubt.

VII. Relief requested

41. That Judge FredRicco McCurry be disqualified from all further proceedings in this matter under section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii).

42. That, under section 170.4, subdivision (d), Judge McCurry take no action in this matter, including at the hearing set for November 4, 2026 and on the fee request served October 27, 2026, subject to the exceptions stated in section 170.4, until the question of his disqualification has been determined.

43. That, if Judge McCurry does not consent to disqualification, the question be determined under section 170.3, subdivision (c)(5) by a judge agreed upon by the parties or, absent agreement within five days, by a judge selected by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. Respondent states now that she does not agree to any judge of the Superior Court of Mendocino County deciding the question, and requests that the clerk notify the Judicial Council as the statute provides.

44. That any order striking this statement be in writing and served with written notice of entry, so that the ten-day period of section 170.3, subdivision (d) is fixed of record.

45. Respondent does not seek to prevent any other judicial officer from hearing any matter in this case, including her own pending petition for enforcement.

VIII. Exhibits

Exh.	Document	A177840 record
1	Clerk's minutes, September 2, 2026	p. 56
2	Order Striking Respondent's Verified Statement of Disqualification; in the Alternative, Verified Answer, filed September 10, 2026 (11 pp.)	—
3	Declaration of Carli Michelle Heller filed October 14, 2026 (¶¶ 6–7) and Declaration filed October 14, 2026 in support of Objection (¶¶ 13–14)	pp. 200, 252
4	Petitioner's Opposition (brief) and Declaration of Kali S. Perkins, filed October 14, 2026	pp. 292–301
5	Respondent's Notice of Ex Parte Request and Objection to Any Extension, filed October 14, 2026 (first pages)	pp. 189, 236–237, 242

6	Order Extending August 12, 2026 Temporary Emergency Custody Orders, filed October 15, 2026, 2:07 p.m.; e-mail of Perkins Family Law transmitting it, October 15, 2026, 2:56 p.m.	pp. 303–304
7	Request for Order (FL-300), filed October 15, 2026, with the court's order of that date denying temporary emergency orders and the Notice of Hearing setting November 4, 2026	p. 306
8	Petitioner's Request for Order (attorney's fees and sanctions, Fam. Code § 271), signed October 25 and filed October 26, 2026, served October 27, 2026 (FL-300), with the pages of the supporting memorandum dated October 23, 2026 stating the amount requested	—
9	Temporary Emergency (Ex Parte) Orders (FL-305), filed August 12, 2026, with its expiration term	pp. 36–39
10	Respondent's Verified Petition for Enforcement (Fam. Code § 3448), filed September 28, 2026, with proposed order to appear	pp. 59–67, 186–187
11	Lee County Temporary Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence, July 6, 2026 (No. 26-DR-031586, Sloan, J.), and Order Setting Hearing, June 18, 2026 (No. 26-DR-031429, Reichling, J.)	pp. 320–332

IX. Verification

I, Carli Michelle Heller, declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that I am the Respondent in this action; that I have read the foregoing Second Verified Statement of Disqualification; and that the facts stated in it are true and correct of my own personal knowledge, except as to matters stated on information and belief, which I believe to be true. The quotations from documents are taken from the documents themselves, copies of which are attached.

Executed on November 2, 2026, at Bonita Springs, Florida.

_____

Carli Michelle Heller
Respondent in propria persona

Dated: November 2, 2026

_____

Carli Michelle Heller
Respondent in propria persona
Residence address confidential (sealed-address designation on file)
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(239) 382-0668 · (410) 507-8198

Proof of service — to be attached upon completion

PERSONAL SERVICE on the Honorable FredRicco McCurry, or on his courtroom clerk, Department C, Mendocino County Superior Court, 100 North State Street, Ukiah, CA 95482 (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (c)(1): personally on the judge, or on his clerk provided the judge is present in the courthouse or in chambers), by registered California process server, Monday, November 2, 2026.

Vincent Michael Hyler, c/o Kali S. Perkins, Esq., Perkins Family Law, PC, 125 E. Mill St., Ukiah, CA 95482 — personal service by the same process server the same day, with electronic copy to kali@perkins-familylaw.com and service@perkins-familylaw.com.

Copy by e-mail to appointed counsel of record on the Order to Show Cause, Mick Hill, Chief Public Defender, hillm@mendocinocounty.gov.