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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

CARLI MICHELLE HELLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

VINCENT MICHAEL HYLER;
JUDITH HYLER;
MICHAEL HYLER;
KALI S. PERKINS, individually;
PERKINS FAMILY LAW, PC;
BRIAN AIGNER, individually;
MARIANO GUZMAN, individually;
LIEUTENANT CHAPMAN (first name unknown), Badge No. 1302, individually;
CARMINE MARCENO, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lee County, Florida;
JOHN DOES 1 through 10;
FREDRICCO McCURRY, ELISABETH ADAMS, PATRICK MICHAEL PEKIN, CARLY DOLAN, J. FRANK PORTER, and KIM TURNER, each in his or her official capacity,

Defendants.

_____/

Case No. 2:26-cv-03119-KCD-NPM

FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DECLARATORY RELIEF, AND DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff Carli Michelle Heller, representing herself, amends her complaint once as a matter of course under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), and alleges as follows:

I. NATURE OF THIS ACTION

1. Plaintiff Carli Michelle Heller is the mother of J.J., a child born in 2024. On February 11, 2026, the Superior Court of California for the County of Mendocino filed Findings and Order After Hearing awarding her sole physical custody of J.J. and permitting her to live in Florida. She lived in Bonita Springs, Lee County, with J.J. Since August 19, 2026, J.J. has been kept from her.

2. The order used to take J.J. from her home was obtained without notice to her, on a sworn declaration in which Defendant Vincent Michael Hyler claimed he had surrendered his firearm. His own firearm receipt contradicts that sworn statement. That is firearm perjury, and it is where this case begins.

3. This action is for what the Defendants did to Plaintiff, in Lee County and in coordination with officials and a lawyer in California: taking J.J. from

her Bonita Springs home on a no-notice order; taking him out of Florida before any order allowed it; refusing to enter him as a missing child; arranging, subpoenaing and preparing the deputy who had taken him to appear as Vincent Hyler's witness against her; and then, the evening after Plaintiff sent sworn criminal complaints to two prosecutors and a federal firearm referral to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, coming to her home on what she was told was a welfare check, after which she was arrested on a charge the State of Florida declined to pursue and held for days in a cold cell. The deputy who had taken J.J., and who had by then been noticed, subpoenaed and prepared as Vincent Hyler's own witness, was at her door that night. Plaintiff's claims arising from that night are pleaded in Count VIII; she will name the remaining deputies when the Sheriff's Office produces its records of it.

4. Much of what is alleged about the coordination among the Defendants is taken from a single source: the itemized time records of Vincent Hyler's California lawyer, Defendant Kali S. Perkins, which she filed in the Mendocino County Superior Court on November 17, 2026, under

penalty of perjury, to support a request that Plaintiff be ordered to pay her fees. Those records are quoted below as her office recorded them. The next day, Defendant Perkins demanded that Plaintiff destroy every copy. The day after that, she asked the Mendocino court to seal them.

5. This amended complaint adds facts taken from the Perkins Defendants' own filed papers of May 26, August 12, October 14, October 15, October 27, and November 17 through 19, 2026; states more exactly what three documents say; and adds two claims under Florida law against the Perkins Defendants only (Counts V and VI). It also adds as defendants the judges who made the orders described below and the officers who administer the two courts. As to them it asks only for a declaratory judgment (Count VII).

6. Plaintiff seeks money damages for the Defendants' own acts. Against the Judicial Defendants and the Court Administration Defendants, identified in Part IV, she seeks no money and no injunction. She seeks a declaratory judgment. She does not ask this Court to vacate, modify, or enforce any state-court order, to decide custody of J.J., or to issue a writ of habeas corpus.

II. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND DIVISION

7. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3)–(4), because Plaintiff's federal claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

8. Count VII is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

9. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over the claims under Florida law pleaded in Counts V and VI against the Perkins Defendants, because they arise from the same events as Plaintiff's federal claims and form part of the same case or controversy.

10. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred in Lee County, Florida: the taking of J.J. from Plaintiff's home on August 19, 2026; the subpoena and preparation of a Lee County deputy as a witness against Plaintiff, arranged by telephone calls into the Lee County Sheriff's Office; the refusal to enter J.J. as a missing child on September 11, 2026; and

the entry into Plaintiff's home on the night of September 29–30, 2026, and her detention, the search of her telephone, her arrest, her confinement in the Lee County jail, and the prosecution that followed.

11. This action belongs in the Fort Myers Division because the events in Florida occurred in Lee County. M.D. Fla. Local Rule 1.04.

12. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants Aigner and Marceno, who reside and act in Florida. It has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Vincent Hyler under § 48.193(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, because he committed tortious acts within Florida: he verified and filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Lee County on August 17, 2026; he received J.J. in Lee County on August 19, 2026, after J.J. was taken from Plaintiff's home; and he then took J.J. out of Florida. It has personal jurisdiction over Defendants Kali S. Perkins and Perkins Family Law, PC under § 48.193(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, because, by their own sworn records, they directed telephone calls to the Lee County Sheriff's Office, its court liaison, its captain on duty and its records department; caused a subpoena to be served on the Lee County Sheriff's Office in Florida; sent remote-appearance instructions to a Lee

County deputy in Florida; and prepared that deputy by telephone to testify against Plaintiff, a Florida resident, in furtherance of the acts alleged below. It has personal jurisdiction over Defendants Judith Hyler, Michael Hyler, Guzman, and Chapman under § 48.193(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, because each is a member of the conspiracy alleged below, and overt acts in furtherance of that conspiracy were committed in Florida.

13. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants Adams and Porter, who reside and act in Florida. It has personal jurisdiction over Defendant McCurry because the order he signed on August 12, 2026, directed that a child living in Lee County, Florida, "be retrieved from mother by law enforcement without notice to mother," and was sent to Florida the same day to be carried out there. It has personal jurisdiction over Defendants Pekin, Dolan and Turner under § 48.193(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes, because Plaintiff alleges, as stated in Count II, that each took part in the understanding alleged there, and overt acts in furtherance of that understanding were committed in Florida: the taking of August 19, 2026, and the calls into the Lee County Sheriff's Office described in Part G. The acts and omissions

alleged against them concern the continued keeping from his mother, who lives in Lee County, of a child taken from Lee County under the order Defendant McCurry sent there. As to Defendant Turner, her office also directed its communication about the ruling of September 2, 2026, to Plaintiff in Florida, as alleged in Part H.

III. THE LIMITS ON THIS COURT'S POWER DO NOT REACH THESE CLAIMS

14. This action does not ask the Court to review or reject any state-court judgment. The *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine is confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the federal proceedings began and inviting the district court's review and rejection of those judgments. *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.*, 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). It is applied claim by claim, and it does not bar a claim for damages caused by a defendant's own unlawful conduct. *Behr v. Campbell*, 8 F.4th 1206, 1212–14 (11th Cir. 2021). Counts I through VI seek damages for what the Defendants themselves did. Count VII asks for a declaration about practices that are continuing in proceedings that

are still pending, in which no final judgment has been entered on the orders described.

15. Abstention under the *Younger* doctrine is limited to three exceptional categories: state criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement proceedings akin to criminal prosecutions, and civil proceedings involving orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions. *Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs*, 571 U.S. 69, 73, 78 (2013).

16. The domestic-relations exception divests the federal courts only of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees, and it is a limit on diversity jurisdiction. *Ankenbrandt v. Richards*, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). Jurisdiction here rests on federal questions, and Plaintiff asks for no custody decree. Counts V and VI are tort claims for damages against persons who are not J.J.'s parents; they rest on supplemental jurisdiction and ask for no custody decree.

17. The private Defendants — Vincent Hyler, Judith Hyler, Michael Hyler, and the Perkins Defendants — have no qualified immunity. *Wyatt v. Cole*, 504 U.S. 158, 168–69 (1992). Private persons who jointly engage with

state officials in the challenged conduct act under color of state law, even where an official with whom they act is immune. *Dennis v. Sparks*, 449 U.S. 24, 27–29 (1980); *Tower v. Glover*, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984).

18. Plaintiff asks for no damages from any judge. Section 1983 provides that "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." Plaintiff asks for the declaratory decree. Acts of court administration are not judicial acts. *Forrester v. White*, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988).

IV. PARTIES

19. Plaintiff Carli Michelle Heller is J.J.'s mother. She resides in Lee County, Florida. Her mailing address for papers in this action is P.O. Box 366326, Bonita Springs, Florida 34136.

20. Defendant Vincent Michael Hyler ("Vincent Hyler") is the putative father of J.J. He resides at or near 9501 Laughlin Way, Redwood Valley, Mendocino County, California.

21. Defendant Judith Hyler is Vincent Hyler's mother. She resides at 9501 Laughlin Way, Redwood Valley, California, where she was personally served on October 26, 2026, in Mendocino County Superior Court No. 26CV04599.

22. Defendant Michael Hyler is Vincent Hyler's father and Judith Hyler's husband. Plaintiff believes, and on that basis alleges, that he resides with Judith Hyler at 9501 Laughlin Way, Redwood Valley, California. On November 9, 2026, counsel wrote to Plaintiff that he had been retained by "Judy Hyler, Mike Hyler, and Vincent Hyler" in Mendocino County Superior Court No. 26CV04599.

23. Defendant Kali S. Perkins is an attorney licensed in California (State Bar No. 238461) and counsel of record for Vincent Hyler in Mendocino County Superior Court No. 25FL01030. She is sued in her individual capacity. Defendant Perkins Family Law, PC is a California professional corporation with its office at 125 East Mill Street, Ukiah, California 95482, through which Ms. Perkins practices and whose employees performed the acts recorded in the time records quoted below. Together they are referred to

as "the Perkins Defendants." At all relevant times the Perkins Defendants were private persons who acted jointly with the state-actor Defendants, as alleged below, and are therefore liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as persons acting under color of state law.

24. Defendant Brian Aigner is a deputy of the Lee County Sheriff's Office, ID No. 2022180. He is sued in his individual capacity. At all relevant times he acted under color of state law.

25. Defendant Mariano Guzman is an investigator employed by the Mendocino County District Attorney's Office. He is sued in his individual capacity. At all relevant times he acted under color of state law.

26. Defendant Lieutenant Chapman (first name unknown; he declined to give it), Badge No. 1302, is employed by the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office. He is sued in his individual capacity. At all relevant times he acted under color of state law.

27. Defendant Carmine Marceno is the Sheriff of Lee County, Florida. He is sued in his official capacity only, as the final policymaker for the law-enforcement and detention operations of the Lee County Sheriff's Office,

including the Lee County jail. Plaintiff's claims under Florida law against the Sheriff are reserved and will be brought, if necessary, after the notice required by § 768.28(6), Florida Statutes.

28. Defendants John Does 1 through 10 are persons whose names Plaintiff does not yet know. They include the deputies and the investigator of the Lee County Sheriff's Office who entered Plaintiff's home, detained her, searched her telephone, and arrested her on the night of September 29–30, 2026; the employees of the Lee County jail responsible for the conditions in which she was held; and any employee of the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office or District Attorney's Office who agreed with or assisted the named Defendants in the acts alleged. On information and belief, these include Jack Woida, a relative of the Hyler family who lives on the same road as the Hylers in Redwood Valley and is employed by the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office. Plaintiff will amend to name each of them when known.

29. Defendant FredRicco McCurry is a judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Mendocino, assigned to Department C, which hears

family law. He is sued in his official capacity, for declaratory relief only. At all relevant times he acted under color of state law.

30. Defendant Elisabeth Adams is a judge of the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Lee County, Florida. She is sued in her official capacity, for declaratory relief only. At all relevant times she acted under color of state law.

31. Defendant Patrick Michael Pekin is a judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Mendocino. He presided on July 3, 2025, when the parties placed on the record the settlement that the Findings and Order After Hearing of February 11, 2026 records; that order recites that the proceeding was heard by him. He is sued in his official capacity, for declaratory relief only. At all relevant times he acted under color of state law. Defendants McCurry, Adams and Pekin are referred to together as "the Judicial Defendants."

32. Defendant Carly Dolan is the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Mendocino, for 2026. She is sued in her official

capacity, for acts and omissions of court administration, for declaratory relief only. At all relevant times she acted under color of state law.

33. Defendant J. Frank Porter is the Chief Judge of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit of Florida. He is sued in his official capacity, for acts and omissions of court administration, for declaratory relief only. At all relevant times he acted under color of state law.

34. Defendant Kim Turner is the Court Executive Officer and Clerk of the Court of the Superior Court of California, County of Mendocino; the file stamp on the order of February 11, 2026 reads "KIM TURNER CLERK OF THE COURT." Her office keeps the court's register of actions and the documents posted on it. She is sued in her official capacity, for acts and omissions of court administration, for declaratory relief only. At all relevant times she acted under color of state law. Defendants Dolan, Porter and Turner are referred to together as "the Court Administration Defendants."

V. OTHER ACTORS AND OTHER ACTIONS

35. Vincent Hyler's Florida lawyer, Carrington Mead, is not named as a defendant in this complaint. His acts are pleaded because they are part of the sequence of events. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend.

36. Plaintiff's claims under California law against Vincent Hyler and Judith Hyler are pending in the Superior Court of California for the County of Mendocino, No. 26CV04599, and against Vincent Hyler, Judith Hyler, and Michael Hyler in No. 26CV04707. They are not repeated here.

VI. FACTS

A. The firearm perjury

37. In late November or early December 2024, a Remington shotgun came into Vincent Hyler's household. Plaintiff's own message of December 2, 2024, records it.

38. The seller showed the shotgun to Plaintiff and, in substance, said it was unregistered or unaccounted for. It was kept in the bedroom closet until January 2025, when Vincent Hyler moved it to Judith Hyler's residence at 9501 Laughlin Way. The shotgun bears no serial number. Plaintiff knows this

because the seller pointed to the place on the gun where a serial number would be, and there is none. Because it has no serial number, it was never surrendered: a firearm that does not officially exist cannot be turned in or logged without creating a record that it exists.

39. The domestic violence restraining order entered against Vincent Hyler on March 20, 2025, in Mendocino County Superior Court No. 25FL01032 (Judicial Council form DV-110), lists his firearms at item 2 as "shot gun and other guns at mother's house." He was personally served by the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office and ordered to surrender all firearms within 24 hours. Plaintiff's declaration filed in that case on April 10, 2025, stated under penalty of perjury that as of April 3, 2025, he had not surrendered "the shotgun and other firearms he maintains at his mother Judy Hyler's residence."

40. Vincent Hyler's firearm receipt of April 15, 2025 (Judicial Council form DV-800), filed in No. 25FL01032, lists two firearms, a Winchester (model "70 feather weight") and a Mauser (model "M12"), both rifles, and answers "No" to whether he has or owns any other firearm. No shotgun

appears on any receipt. Text messages of April 22, 2025, show the Remington left off the receipt.

41. On August 12, 2026, in the declaration he filed to obtain the no-notice order described below, Vincent Hyler swore that "I surrendered the firearm referenced in the 2025 directive," and attached the April 15, 2025 receipt as his Exhibit F. That sworn statement is false, and his own receipt shows it is false. Defendant Perkins prepared, filed and served that declaration, and has since billed her client for doing so. The memorandum of points and authorities that Defendant Perkins signed and filed with it told the court that "the firearm-surrender directive has been complied with."

B. The Hyler household, and what Vincent Hyler said he would do — December 2024 to March 2025

42. Michael Hyler paid Vincent Hyler's bar tabs, as Judith Hyler and Loren Hyler confirmed to Plaintiff. On December 25, 2024, when Plaintiff asked Michael Hyler and Judith Hyler to help with Vincent Hyler's drinking, Michael Hyler told her she needed to show Vincent Hyler more respect.

43. On March 6, 2025, the Ring camera in the living room at 9501 Laughlin Way recorded Vincent Hyler, holding J.J., going over backward at the table at 7:27:33 p.m. Pacific time, with J.J. in his arms, and knocking the table over. J.J. was back in Plaintiff's arms at 7:32:57 p.m. Plaintiff's declaration filed April 10, 2025, states that J.J. "began crying loudly," and that when she sent the footage to Judith Hyler and Vincent Hyler's sisters asking for help, "they responded as if it were merely amusing." On March 15, 2025, Vincent Hyler himself called it "that little video of me fallin' over drunk."

44. On March 15, 2025, a Ring camera at the Laughlin Way house recorded a 39-minute confrontation between Vincent Hyler and Plaintiff. J.J. was six months old.

45. At 00:02:05 of the recording, Vincent Hyler said: "The paperwork's filed … I'm goin' full custody. I know it's filed." At 00:02:29 he said: "My family's got money too." At 00:06:45 he said: "I tried to keep legality out of it 'til you called the cops."

46. At 00:27:58 he said: "Get a U-Haul — and you will be bein' served Monday." At 00:28:18 he said: "My location is turned off."

47. At 00:30:43 he said: "you're not in this county with any judges — you think I don't have family that's already been in and out of this shit … a little bit of familiarity — more than what you've got."

48. At 00:31:40 he said: "all I have to do is call the cops and you are gone — you're not a breastfeedin' mother — you don't have to take the boy with you — I know — I've done my homework." At about 3:00 p.m. he drove away with J.J.

49. On March 16, 2025, between 3:01:21 and 3:01:39 a.m. Pacific time, a doorbell camera recorded Vincent Hyler, with J.J. in his car, saying: "you're gonna let the boy in, and if you don't, I'm gonna fucking kill you."

50. That night, after Plaintiff called 911 and deputies of the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office responded, at about 11:44 p.m. Vincent Hyler took J.J. from his crib and left with the front door open. When Plaintiff reached Judith Hyler, Judith Hyler confirmed by text that J.J. was at her residence and declined to return him.

51. On Monday, March 17, 2025, Vincent Hyler filed a request for custody in Mendocino County Superior Court No. 25FL01030.

52. On March 20, 2025, Judith Hyler carried J.J. out of Plaintiff's home, on camera.

C. The custody order Plaintiff holds

53. On February 11, 2026, the Mendocino County Superior Court filed Findings and Order After Hearing stating: "Petitioner [Carli] is awarded sole physical custody of the minor child." The order permitted Plaintiff to reside with family members in Florida. It ordered that Vincent Hyler "shall be clean and sober during all visits." As to his visits, it provided: "Initially, Prior to Petitioner's move, Respondent shall have one supervised visit per week, up to two hours, supervised by Judy Hyler"; "After Petitioner's move, Respondent may have daytime visitation for up to seven consecutive days, with no overnights"; and "After five successful visits, Respondent may step up to overnight visitation." In that order Plaintiff is the Petitioner and Vincent Hyler is the Respondent. Vincent Hyler's own declaration of August 12, 2026, the declaration on which J.J. was taken from her, describes that order in

these words: "Respondent Carli Heller has sole physical custody," and "I have a supervised step-up visitation schedule."

54. The minutes of the Mendocino court for May 26, 2026, state that the court "reminds both parties that the February order remains the standing order and they are to comply." The same day, Defendant Perkins wrote to Plaintiff's then counsel that "the Court has twice confirmed that the current order remains valid and enforceable." On September 10, 2026, the same court's signed order recited that on May 26, 2026, it had "reminded the parties that the FOAH issued on February 11, 2026, contained the standing orders for the parties to follow in both cases."

55. On September 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed in the Circuit Court for Lee County, No. 26-DR-006457, a request under section 61.528, Florida Statutes, to register the February 11, 2026 order, with a certified copy (Filing No. 257511473). The clerk accepted and docketed that filing on September 22, 2026. On September 26, 2026, Vincent Hyler and Judith Hyler each signed for the notice of that registration. No request for a hearing to contest the registration was made within the twenty days the statute allows, which

ended on October 16, 2026. By statute, "[i]f a timely request for a hearing to contest the validity of the registration is not made, the registration is confirmed as a matter of law." § 61.528(5), Fla. Stat. On September 24, 2026, the Lee County court ordered Plaintiff's enforcement action "held in abeyance, pending further ruling by the California court," and stated: "Once that court enters an order ripe for enforcement this court will resume enforcement, if appropriate."

56. In June 2026, Plaintiff petitioned the Circuit Court for Lee County for an injunction for protection against domestic violence against Vincent Hyler, No. 26-DR-031429. On June 18, 2026, Judge Trent Reichling signed an order stating that "[t]his Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter," declining to enter a temporary injunction before a hearing, and setting the petition for hearing on June 30, 2026, at 8:30 a.m., in Courtroom 5-D. Vincent Hyler appeared in that case through Mr. Mead on June 22, 2026. On June 30, 2026, at 8:33 a.m., Plaintiff filed a motion to continue the hearing. At 9:43 a.m. an order was filed dismissing the case "without prejudice." Of the grounds printed on the form, the order checks

"Petitioner failed to appear at the hearing scheduled in this cause" and leaves unchecked "The evidence presented is insufficient under Florida law."

57. On July 6, 2026, Senior Judge James D. Sloan of the Circuit Court for Lee County, in No. 26-DR-031586, entered a Temporary Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence against Vincent Hyler. Under the heading "Findings," it states: "It also appears that Petitioner is a victim of domestic violence by Respondent, and/or Petitioner has reasonable cause to believe he/she is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence by Respondent, and that there is immediate and present danger of domestic violence to Petitioner or persons lawfully with Petitioner." It ordered that "Respondent shall not use or possess a firearm or ammunition." It lists Plaintiff's current residence as "Confidential." On July 20, 2026, that case was dismissed "without prejudice" on the same form, with the same ground checked and the same ground left unchecked. Neither dismissal rests on the evidence.

D. The order obtained without notice — August 11–12, 2026

58. On July 6, 2026, the same day as the Florida injunction, Vincent Hyler filed papers in Mendocino seeking an order to show cause re contempt against Plaintiff. On August 11, 2026, at the contempt hearing, the Mendocino court found that Plaintiff had not been served with the order to show cause. Vincent Hyler's Florida lawyer, Carrington Mead, appeared remotely.

59. On August 12, 2026, Vincent Hyler applied ex parte. The court's register records the declaration regarding notice filed with that application as "NOTICE NOT GIVEN." Defendant Perkins's time records for August 11 and 12, 2026 show her office researching, drafting, editing and filing the application, and record that her office received the signed order the same day and sent it "to FL attorney and client for fu."

60. The declaration regarding notice filed with that application (local form MMC-121) was signed by Defendant Perkins herself, under penalty of perjury, as attorney for Vincent Hyler. Under the printed words "I have not given notice of this request for ex parte orders because," she checked "Notice

would frustrate the purpose of the orders sought" and "Other," and wrote: "Fear that mother will abscond with the child."

61. The order signed that day (Judicial Council form FL-305) gave Vincent Hyler temporary physical custody, limited Plaintiff to "Supervised virtual visitation only," and stated at item 6: "The child is to be retrieved from mother by law enforcement without notice to mother for fear she will abscond with the child."

62. The FL-305 states in print that its temporary emergency orders "expire on the date and time of the hearing" set for September 2, 2026, at 9:30 a.m., "unless extended by court order." Its boxes for domestic violence, sexual abuse, and firearms were left blank. The domestic-violence presumption was not applied, although Vincent Hyler's own application attached the Lee County temporary injunction of July 6, 2026.

63. The ground typed on the FL-305 for the order is that Plaintiff "has impeded visitation and concealed the child while not being able to properly care for him." The papers Defendant Perkins filed that day show what the concealment was. Her memorandum states that "JJ resides in Florida"; that

the removal ground for an emergency order "is inapplicable here because JJ already lawfully left California under the Judgment"; and that "[t]he strongest available showing on immediate harm is not medical" but includes "affirmative, current concealment of Respondent's address: both from Petitioner directly and by confidentiality designation in her own Florida filings." Vincent Hyler's declaration, filed with it, states: "The only address I have for Carli and JJ was obtained through a law enforcement welfare check conducted in February 2026." The address designated confidential in Plaintiff's Florida filings was her address as a petitioner for protection against domestic violence. Vincent Hyler had it: seven days later, by the Lee County court's own finding, the warrant was executed "at Mother's location identified in the petition."

64. Exhibit M — the schedule of the Perkins Defendants' own time entries that Defendant Perkins filed under penalty of perjury on November 17, 2026, described in paragraph 75 — records their work with Vincent Hyler's Florida lawyer before and after that application. On August 7, 2026, five days before it, Defendant Perkins recorded a telephone call of 0.8 hours

"with Carrington Mead FL attorney"; the subject of the call is redacted (entry 20). On August 10, 2026, her office recorded: "File remote appearance for Rusty, attorney in Florida" (entry 37). On August 12, 2026, the day the order was signed, her office recorded: "Review TECO granted documents, discuss with team, and next steps for domestication" (entry 48). On August 13, 2026, Defendant Perkins recorded "comm w/ FL attorney and JG re: docs we need" (entry 51), and the schedule lists as a cost for that day: "Fed-Ex cost for sending Rusty (FL Attorney) certified copies of the emergency order and birth certificate." Plaintiff believes, and on that basis alleges, that "Rusty" is Mr. Mead.

E. The taking — August 17–19, 2026

65. On August 17, 2026, Vincent Hyler, through Mr. Mead, filed a verified petition in the Circuit Court for Lee County, No. 26-DR-005826, to enforce the August 12 order.

66. On August 19, 2026, at 2:52 p.m., a Lee County judge signed the order and warrant Mr. Mead had drafted, without notice to Plaintiff. Its footer reads "Proposed Emergency Ex Parte Order and Child-Pickup

Warrant." Its paragraph 8 states: "Until the Florida return hearing, Father shall not remove the Child from Florida without further order of this Court." Its paragraph 9 states: "No service or other communication shall be made to Mother before the Child is secured unless the Court later orders otherwise." Its service list reads: "Carli Michelle Heller, Respondent - SERVICE DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER THE CHILD IS SECURED." Its paragraph 16(d) states that it expires with the California order at the September 2, 2026 hearing "unless proof of a written extension is presented."

67. That evening, Lee County deputies took J.J. from Plaintiff's home in Bonita Springs and released him to Vincent Hyler. The reporting deputy was Defendant Aigner. About twelve deputies came. Plaintiff tried three times to hand over J.J.'s medical information, and each time it was refused. Deputies pressed her for the specialty formula she had paid for and told her that if she did not give them more formula, she did not care about her son. The warrant itself provided that officers "may allow the Child's necessary clothing, medications, comfort items, and age-appropriate supplies to accompany him."

Defendant Perkins's time records for that day read: "Emails with KP, CM and team re: retrieval of child!"

68. Vincent Hyler was in Lee County that evening to receive J.J. Defendant Perkins's letter of May 26, 2026, to Plaintiff's then counsel had stated that "Mr. Hyler will be present in Florida on the dates listed below," and the dates listed include "August 19-26, 2026."

69. Defendant Aigner's report of August 19 recorded observations about Plaintiff that were unsupported by any test, any medic, any arrest, or any offense. Defendant Perkins's office reviewed that report on August 24, 2026 ("Review incident report from child pick up. Notate 3 officers that appeared"), served it on Plaintiff on August 31, 2026, as an exhibit, and Vincent Hyler relied on it to seek a psychological evaluation of Plaintiff in the Mendocino case.

F. J.J. was taken out of Florida before any order allowed it

70. The warrant set the return hearing for August 20, 2026, at 2:30 p.m., in Courtroom 4Q of the Lee County Justice Center. Plaintiff went on August 20. At 2:16 and 2:18 p.m. she e-mailed the judge's chambers that she

was on her way and delayed by construction. The courtroom had been changed; she reached it about thirty minutes late, and the matter was over. She was not heard. On August 21, 2026, she filed a verified emergency motion in that case (Filing No. 255363967) stating that she had been present in the courthouse, that the courtroom had been changed, and that she had not been heard. On August 21, 2026, at 9:55 p.m. Eastern time, Mr. Mead submitted a proposed order (Filing No. 255441316). On August 24, 2026, Plaintiff wrote to the judge's chambers: "I respectfully request that the Court not sign any proposed order in this cause until I have been heard." The order signed on August 27, 2026, recites a return hearing "on August 21, 2026, at 2:30 p.m.," and states that Plaintiff was served with "notice of the August 21, 2026 hearing" and "failed to appear." The only hearing date on the warrant is August 20, 2026. Plaintiff received no notice of a hearing on August 21, 2026. Paragraph 3 of the order reads: "Father is AUTHORIZED to leave Florida and travel to California with the Child." The same order recites that "Mother was personally served after the Child had been secured pursuant to the

Florida Warrant," and again that "Mother was served after the Child had been secured."

71. On August 26, 2026, at 1:00 p.m. Pacific time, J.J. was at a clinic in Ukiah, California. The clinic record is Vincent Hyler's own exhibit.

72. The order containing that authorization was signed on August 27, 2026, at 1:11 p.m. Eastern time, the day after J.J. was in Ukiah. Until then, paragraph 8 of the warrant forbade removing J.J. from Florida "without further order of this Court." Vincent Hyler removed J.J. from Florida in violation of paragraph 8 of the warrant he had obtained, before the order he himself had asked for was signed.

73. Exhibit M records that on August 26, 2026, Defendant Perkins personally recorded: "review information from client re: dr visit" (entry 91). Plaintiff believes, and on that basis alleges, that the "dr visit" is J.J.'s visit to the clinic in Ukiah that day, and that Defendant Perkins therefore knew on August 26, 2026, that J.J. was in California.

G. The Perkins Defendants recruit, subpoena and prepare the deputy as Vincent Hyler's witness — August 26 to September 1, 2026

74. On August 26, 2026, the same day J.J. was in Ukiah, Defendant Perkins filed in No. 25FL01030 a "Notice of Remote Appearance by PT Deputy Brian Aigner." "PT" is the register's abbreviation for Petitioner, Vincent Hyler. On August 28, 2026, an order "Regarding Remote Appearance by PT Deputy Brian Aigner" was entered.

75. On November 17, 2026, Defendant Perkins filed and served in No. 25FL01030 an amended declaration under penalty of perjury with a schedule, Exhibit M, of her office's time entries. She swore that "Time is recorded contemporaneously, in tenths of an hour, by the person performing the work," and that the descriptions "appear as billed." She assigned each entry to a lettered ground of her fee request. Her amended memorandum titles ground "F" "Ms. Heller's Conduct Toward This Court's Custody Orders Required An Emergency Order, Enforcement In Florida, And A Contempt Proceeding," and ground "H" "Law-Enforcement Contacts Following Ms. Heller's Reports Required Counsel's Response." The first contact from Plaintiff that the

memorandum identifies under ground H is September 3, 2026. The entries assigned to ground H begin on August 26, 2026.

76. Exhibit M records, for August 26, 2026: "Drafting remote appearance notice and proposed order for officer Brian Aigner" (entry 88, ground F); "begin prep for contempt hearing - comm w/ AS re: POS and re prep for 9/2 hearing and officer appearance" (entry 91, ground F, Defendant Perkins personally); "Finalize drafted RA and proposed order for officer" (entry 92, ground F); "Emails with Ody Process Serving to handle same day service of SDT for officer appearance" (entry 95, ground F); "Calls with Lee County Sherriffs office, court liason, captain on duty and records department regarding officer appearance and providing the police report from August 19 at the 9/2 hearing," 1.2 hours (entry 96, ground H); "Call with court liason and process server re: zoom link timing and providing further information" (entry 97, ground H); "confirmation call and email regarding service of sdt with Ody" (entry 99, ground F); "Discussion with KP re: POS and re prep for 9/2 hearing and officer appearance" (entry 102, ground F); and "Locate subpoena documents on court website. Prepare sdt for officer appearance and

document production of report. Send to KP to review" (entry 103, ground H). The same schedule lists as a cost for August 26, 2026: "Process Serving: Subpoena to Lee County Sheriff Office for Deputy appearance — $225.00."

77. Exhibit M records, for August 27, 2026: "Provide remote appearance instructions to officer In FL for TECO hearing. P/C with court liason re the same" (entry 110, ground F), and "Email zoom instructions to court liason for 9/2 appearance" (entry 113, ground H). For August 31, 2026: "Email to court liason re appearance" (entry 127, ground H) and "Email to deputy re: appt for prep ahead of hearing" (entry 137, ground H).

78. Exhibit M records, for September 1, 2026, the day before the hearing: "Call with Officer for preparation before hearings. Call with KP re the same," 0.9 hours (entry 140, ground H), and "Talk with KP re: officer prep and email officer to set appointment" (entry 144, ground H).

79. From August 26, 2026, forward, Defendant Aigner was Vincent Hyler's noticed and subpoenaed witness against Plaintiff, prepared by Vincent Hyler's lawyer, in the same matter in which he had taken J.J. from

her home. Every one of those acts was performed by the Perkins Defendants, for Vincent Hyler, and billed to him.

H. September 2, 2026

80. The clerk's minutes of September 2, 2026, state that the court "must respond to" Plaintiff's August 31 challenge to the judge, "which will not occur this morning"; that "Both the Motion and the Order to Show Cause are continued to September 15, 2026"; and that "The pending ex parte will be deferred to Judge Pekin pending recusal." The minutes record no extension of the August 12 orders.

81. The same day, Defendant Pekin denied Plaintiff's ex parte application for an order disclosing where J.J. was. His handwritten notation on her application, dated September 2, 2026, 12:56 p.m., reads: "DENIED, no actual exigency shown. No showing why this should not be brought by noticed motion," and states that the application "seeks to circumvent a TECO while disqualification is pending as to judge who issued the TECO." The court's register records the application as "DENIED." The notation was not sent to Plaintiff. On September 10, 2026, at 7:44 p.m. Eastern time, the court's

administration wrote to her that "your copies of the ex parte are available for pick up" at the courthouse, because "there was no email address on the pleadings." Plaintiff lives in Florida. Her filings of September 4 and September 11, 2026, written before the notation reached her, describe the application as pending.

I. The Mendocino County offices

82. On September 3, 2026, Plaintiff reported to the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office that J.J. had been taken out of Florida and that she had not been told where he was.

83. On September 4, 2026, Plaintiff sent a written referral to District Attorney David Eyster, his chief investigator, and Defendant Guzman, with a fact sheet and her petition, asking that J.J. be located and returned under California Family Code sections 3130, 3131 and 3134.5. Section 3131 provides that where a custody order has been entered and the child is taken or detained by another person in violation of it, "the district attorney shall take all actions necessary to locate and return the child." Mr. Eyster's address answered automatically: "This email address is NOT monitored." On

September 5 and 6, 2026, Plaintiff faxed the office a fifty-page request for a protective-custody warrant. On September 7, 2026, a Mendocino County Sheriff's deputy took Plaintiff's report under California Penal Code § 278.5, Report No. 2026-16870. On September 8, 2026, Plaintiff wrote to Mr. Eyster directly. The District Attorney's office has never answered her in writing.

84. Exhibit M records that on September 3, 2026, Defendant Perkins personally had a "phn call with investigator Mariano from MCSO re: heller report of kidnap" (entry 151), and that her office discussed "call from investigator Mariano from MCSO re: opp report of kidnap" (entry 153). Her amended declaration states that on that date "Investigator Mariano of the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office called me about a report by Ms. Heller that the child had been kidnapped." Plaintiff believes, and on that basis alleges, that "investigator Mariano" is Defendant Mariano Guzman.

85. Plaintiff first reached Defendant Guzman by telephone on September 1 and 2, 2026, to report that J.J. was being concealed. He asked her how it could be a crime if a judge had signed an order. She reported that exchange in writing to the California Department of Justice on September 5,

2026. On September 8, 2026, at 2:44 p.m., Defendant Guzman spoke with Plaintiff by telephone. Plaintiff made verbatim notes of what was said.

86. Defendant Guzman told Plaintiff that the other side had spoken with him: "Because they've told me you have not." He told her: "You're at home. All you're doing is every day writing stuff to file in court. That's all you're doing." And: "Maybe you had to think about hiring a lawyer."

87. Defendant Guzman told Plaintiff: "I'm the one that's assigned this case, and there's nothing to do with this case. The judge has already made an order. The father has custody. You have video visitation." When Plaintiff said the order had expired on September 2, he answered: "You're incorrect." Asked for the order he relied on, he said: "You can look it up in the portal." Defendant Guzman acted after Plaintiff told him that "The only order that is in place is the February 11th one." He told her: "We don't have nothing to give to you. Just continue going to court and do what the judge is telling you to do. That's what we are going to recommend to you, and I'm recommending it to you right now. Just follow the judge's instructions."

88. Exhibit M records that on the same day, September 8, 2026, Defendant Perkins personally made a note to "check in w/ client via portal re status, discuss addl false police report made and calls" (entry 157), and that her office reviewed the "client portal re addl false police report made and calls, discuss with KP" (entry 158). Her amended declaration states: "On September 8, 2026, Mr. Hyler reported to my office a further police contact and calls." The next day, September 9, her office recorded: "Begin drafting sanctions motion. Review client messages, OPP filings and accusations for inclusion. Message to client re: police report needed and updates re visit from police" (entry 159). From September 8, 2026, forward, the Perkins Defendants' own records describe Plaintiff's reports to law enforcement as "false police report[s]."

89. Plaintiff's reports were not false. Each concerned J.J.'s removal from Florida in violation of paragraph 8 of the Lee County warrant, before any order permitted it, and his being kept from the parent who held the only custody order in force, at a location she was not told. At a hearing in No. 25FL01030 in the spring of 2026, at which Plaintiff was represented by

counsel, Defendant Perkins had repeatedly called Plaintiff a kidnapper for living with J.J. in Florida, where the February 11, 2026 order expressly permitted her to live. Defendant Perkins's own memorandum of August 12, 2026, states that J.J. "already lawfully left California under the Judgment." In September 2026 her office recorded Plaintiff's reports of a removal in violation of an actual court order as "false police report[s]" and set about gathering police records "for sanctions motion" against her.

90. Exhibit M records that between September 15 and September 23, 2026, the Perkins Defendants gathered police records about Plaintiff for use against her: "status of police report docs for sanctions motion" (entry 169, Defendant Perkins personally); "Emails with team re incident reports" (entry 170); "comm w/ AS re: sanctions motion, comm w/ JG re; fu w/ da" (entry 174, Defendant Perkins personally); "Emails with team re incident reports and access them for motion" (entry 175); "Drafting request for police records for UPD re welfare check/ police showing up at clients house" (entry 176); "review sdt for officer for personal app and fu comm w/ PFL team re: addl sdts for out of state officers at hearing" (entry 178, Defendant Perkins personally);

"Sending records request to Mendocino County Sheriffs Office for incident report/ wellness check" (entry 180); "Discuss witnesses with KP. call to officer re additional appearance" (entry 182); and "fu comm w/ PFL team re: records request for police reports for 12/9 hearing" (entry 184, Defendant Perkins personally).

91. On September 28, 2026, at 12:37 p.m. and 3:55 p.m. Eastern time, Plaintiff sent two written requests to the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office asking that a deputy take J.J. into protective custody under California Penal Code § 279.6, or conduct a welfare check on him at 9501 Laughlin Way, citing Report No. 2026-16870.

92. Shortly before 4:18 p.m. Eastern time that day, Defendant Chapman telephoned Plaintiff. He told her he had spoken with Investigator Guzman, that the Sheriff's Office "would not be doing anything either," and that it was "taking the same position as the District Attorney's Office." When Plaintiff gave the recorded death threat and the unsurrendered firearm as grounds, he said those were "things that happened in the past." He gave his badge number, 1302, only after being asked at least twice, and he would not

give his first name. At 5:46 p.m. Eastern time, Plaintiff reported his refusal in writing to the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office, with copies to the Mendocino County District Attorney's Office and to Lt. John Desrosiers of the Lee County Sheriff's Office.

93. No deputy has reported to Plaintiff the result of any welfare check on J.J. Yet welfare checks occurred, and their results went to Vincent Hyler's lawyer and to Defendant Guzman. Exhibit M records, on September 21, 2026, "Drafting request for police records for UPD re welfare check/ police showing up at clients house" (entry 176), and on September 29, a "Phone call with DA Guzman, following up with clients message regarding 2nd welfare check with Lt. Chapman" (entry 194). Defendant Perkins's amended declaration states that on September 29, 2026, "my office spoke with Deputy District Attorney Guzman following a second welfare check at Mr. Hyler's home."

J. The Lee County Sheriff's Office refuses to enter J.J. as a missing child

94. On September 11, 2026, at about 1:00 a.m., Plaintiff called the Lee County Sheriff's Office to report J.J. missing and endangered. Defendant

Aigner, the deputy who had taken J.J. on August 19 and who had been noticed, subpoenaed and prepared as Vincent Hyler's witness between August 26 and September 1, came to her door on that report. Plaintiff recorded what he said. He told her: "He's not missing, so he won't be entered into the system," and "A police report is for a crime. There's no crime that was committed." He took no missing-child report. The only number he gave her, with his badge number, 22180 (ID No. 2022180), was a case number for his own response, 26494309.

95. At 11:04 a.m. that day, his lieutenant, Lt. John Desrosiers, wrote that there was "no further law-enforcement action for the Lee County Sheriff's Office to take" and that the office was "unable to enter your son as a missing person," that the matter was "civil in nature," and that "there is no additional action to be taken by the Lee County Sheriff's Office." At 1:13 p.m. Plaintiff answered in writing that the August 12 order had expired by its terms and that the Mendocino judge's own order of September 10 named her February 11 order as the standing order, and asked that if the office declined

to enter J.J. or to refer the case to the State Attorney, it "say so in writing." It did not.

96. Between September 11 and September 28, 2026, Plaintiff sent the Lee County Sheriff's Office eleven written communications. They included a sworn missing-child report under § 937.021, Florida Statutes, sent on September 24, and its follow-ups. Two of them were addressed to Sheriff Marceno by name. Each concerned the office's own refusal to enter J.J. as a missing child and named the responding deputy by badge number from the first morning. On September 14, 2026, Plaintiff's process server attempted to hand-deliver her sworn papers to the Sheriff's Office, and reported that the office refused to accept them. The office's only substantive written reply was Lt. Desrosiers's e-mail of September 11. The Sheriff's Office was the only agency that could make the entry: the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children told Plaintiff on September 11, 2026 that only the reporting law-enforcement agency could open a case, and on September 19, 2026, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement's Missing Endangered Persons Information Clearinghouse wrote that it "would not be able to assist

you in entering your son as missing into FCIC/NCIC." Federal law provides that "[e]ach Federal, State, and local law enforcement agency shall report each case of a missing child under the age of 21" reported to it to the National Crime Information Center. 34 U.S.C. § 41307(a). J.J. has never been entered as a missing child.

97. On September 15 and 16, 2026, the Office of the State Attorney for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit wrote that its role is "strictly to prosecute cases brought to us by our local police agencies in almost all circumstances," that "This is a civil matter being handled in the court system," and that a criminal complaint should be presented to the law-enforcement agency.

K. The sworn complaints of September 28 and the arrest of September 29–30

98. On September 28, 2026, at 8:17 a.m. Eastern time, Plaintiff sent the Lee County Sheriff's Office her fourth written request, "for Sheriff Marceno," for confirmation that J.J. had been entered as a missing child. It recited her three prior requests and stated: "None has been answered."

99. On September 28, 2026, at 5:31 p.m. Eastern time, Plaintiff sent a sworn criminal complaint to the Mendocino County District Attorney requesting felony charges against Vincent Hyler and Judith Hyler. It was copied to Lt. Desrosiers of the Lee County Sheriff's Office.

100. At 5:31 p.m. the same day, Plaintiff sent Supplemental Sworn Complaint No. 3 to the State Attorney for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, requesting a written charging decision by September 29, 2026. It was copied to Lt. Desrosiers.

101. At 5:32 p.m. the same day, Plaintiff sent a referral to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives concerning Vincent Hyler's possession of a firearm while subject to a domestic-violence protective order, with a two-year-old at the address.

102. On September 29, 2026 — the day deputies came to Plaintiff's home, where they arrested her at 12:51 a.m. — the Perkins Defendants' office recorded a "Phone call with DA Guzman, following up with clients message regarding 2nd welfare check with Lt. Chapman. Guzman confirming he will reach out to Sheriff's office, and spoke about a restraining order against

Heller. No criminal charges for false reporting against Heller" (entry 194). That is: that same day, Vincent Hyler's lawyer's office, following up on its "clients message" about the second welfare check, spoke with a District Attorney's investigator about a restraining order against Plaintiff and about criminal charges against Plaintiff, and the investigator undertook to "reach out to Sheriff's office."

103. According to the probable-cause statement later produced to Plaintiff, on September 29, 2026, the Lee County Sheriff's Office Intelligence Unit was notified, through FBI Guardian Tip No. 1414310, of statements attributed to Plaintiff's e-mail account, made on September 26 and 27, 2026, in a private session with an artificial-intelligence application that Plaintiff used as a personal diary. The statement records that deputies of the 4th Precinct responded to her home and that Intelligence Detective Thomas Steven Alejo (ID No. 2015065) then "responded to the residence and assumed the investigation." The deputies who came first are not named in it.

104. That evening, September 29, 2026, deputies of the Lee County Sheriff's Office appeared outside Plaintiff's lanai. Defendant Aigner was

among them. He told Plaintiff he was there to "exonerate" her, that he knew only of "some posts," that he knew she was "going through a lot," and that there were "concerning posts" she should be able to clear up. He said a crime was being looked into as well, but he presented the visit as a welfare check about her. He called the material posts, then messages, said it was maybe on social media, and asked for her Twitter handle. Plaintiff believed her accounts had been hacked.

105. Relying on what Defendant Aigner told her, Plaintiff admitted three deputies into her home and her bedroom. She would not have admitted them had she been told the purpose of the visit.

106. After she admitted them, Plaintiff was placed in a locked patrol car for about two and a half hours, in the cold, before an investigator arrived and told her that it was not a welfare check. The probable-cause statement records that the 4th Precinct deputies "made contact with Heller" and that "Heller was detained without incident" before Detective Alejo arrived. She was not permitted to lock or even close her door, or to put her dogs away; deputies went back inside themselves to retrieve her glasses. She was then

held for one to two more hours at the Sheriff's Office investigations building, in the middle of the night, and made to unlock her telephone. The deputies questioned Plaintiff, and obtained her statements and her consent to enter her home, before any *Miranda* warning was given. When she was read her rights, the encounter had been represented to her as a welfare check, about "concerning posts" she could clear up, by an officer there to "exonerate" her; on that representation she did not ask for a lawyer, and spoke. She was deceived about the purpose of the encounter, and by that deception and the conduct of the arrest she was, in substance, deprived of the protection the *Miranda* warning exists to give. The probable-cause statement sworn by Detective Alejo states that he read her a *Miranda* warning from an agency-issued card when he arrived at the residence.

107. Plaintiff was then arrested and charged under § 836.10, Florida Statutes, Lee County Case No. 26-CF-017549. The booking report records the arrest at 12:51 a.m. on September 30, 2026, at her home, with no weapon seized, and a bond of $10,000. The probable-cause statement was sworn by Detective Alejo, not by Defendant Aigner; it names a reviewing supervisor,

Joshua Doragh (ID No. 2014093). At first appearance on October 1, 2026, the court set bond at $75,000, found Plaintiff indigent and appointed the Public Defender, and ordered GPS monitoring with exclusion zones. No medic was called. The Sheriff's Office kept her telephone. Her dogs were taken to the county shelter; recovering them cost about $600.

108. Exhibit M records that on September 30, 2026, Defendant Perkins personally recorded "comm w/ client and team re: harassment by OPP re: welfare checks and request for fu w/ Guzman re: same" (entry 199), and that on October 1, 2026, she recorded "fu comm re: comm w/ DA and sheriff's office" (entry 205) and "review comm w/ DA office re: same, and her filings" (entry 206). "OPP" is Plaintiff. Exhibit M further records, for October 6, 2026: "receipt and review of incident report from police" (entry 253) and "Following up with sherif department incident reports, submitting pra request" (entry 254).

109. Plaintiff made no true threat. What was reported to the Sheriff's Office was written in a private session with an application she used as a diary; it was not addressed or sent to any person; she told Detective Alejo

that she owned no firearm and had no intention of carrying out anything she had written; the booking report records no weapon seized; and the probable-cause statement, produced to Plaintiff on November 18, 2026, through her criminal-defense counsel, records her statement that she believed the application was a private space. The State of Florida reviewed the arrest and on October 26, 2026 declined to file any charge.

110. Plaintiff's claims arising from the entry into her home, her detention, the search of her telephone, her arrest, and her prosecution on September 29 and 30, 2026, are pleaded in Count VIII against Defendant Aigner, Defendant Guzman, the Perkins Defendants, and Does 1 through 10. On October 18, 2026, Plaintiff requested in writing that the Lee County Sheriff's Office preserve and produce its records of that night; its complete records, including the identities of the responding deputies, have not been produced. Plaintiff will name those deputies, and Detective Alejo if the records warrant it, when they are. The events of that night are also part of the sequence alleged in Count II and of the harm alleged below.

L. The jail

111. Plaintiff was booked into the Lee County jail on the night of September 29–30, 2026. She is immunocompromised. For the days she was held, until her release on or about October 1, 2026, she was kept in a cell that was cold, and she was freezing throughout. Basic needs were not met. On information and belief, the temperature at which she was held was the ordinary condition of the facility and not an accident of her cell.

112. Plaintiff attended first appearance from the jail. She watched the bail set for the other people in the room, and hers was the highest, although she had no record of any kind and had harmed no one: $75,000. Her parents bonded her out. Had they not been able to, she would have remained in that cell until at least November 2, 2026, the arraignment date set in the order. She was released on conditions that included a GPS ankle monitor, and was charged a booking fee.

113. Plaintiff's arrest was reported on local television the next day, and online harassment followed.

114. On October 5, 2026, Google notified Plaintiff that it had received legal process issued by the Lee County Sheriff's Office compelling the release of information related to her account, hellercwp@gmail.com, bearing reference numbers 26-530248 and 26-CF-017549. The copy Google sent her on October 12 is a subpoena duces tecum issued in the name of the State Attorney for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, marked "DO NOT DISCLOSE," for the "Subscriber information, account information and payment information" of that account "from September 15, 2026 to September 29, 2026," with the records to be delivered to a Lee County Sheriff's Office detective. That is the account from which Plaintiff sent every complaint described above to the Sheriff's Office, the State Attorney, the Mendocino County District Attorney, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. It is also her service address in the Florida and California proceedings and her channel to her counsel.

115. On October 26, 2026, the State of Florida gave notice that no information would be filed in Case No. 26-CF-017549. The prosecution ended

without a conviction. The ankle monitor was still on Plaintiff the next day, and as of November 18, 2026, the Sheriff's Office still held her telephone.

M. September to November 2026

116. On September 15, 2026, Defendant Perkins stated from the floor that the August 12 orders were extended. No motion was before the court. Plaintiff objected on the record. No written order followed that day. Defendant Perkins's own time entry for that appearance reads: "court appearance, public defender appointed, all matters put over to 12/9, all of her RFOs/Ex Parte requests denied" (entry 167). It records no extension.

117. Exhibit M records that on October 5, 2026, Defendant Perkins personally recorded "review and prep proposed order for court for TECO extension" (entry 234), and that her office recorded "proposed order (TECO) for judge's signature" (entry 243) and "Prepare proposed order for KP to take to court" (entry 244). "TECO" is her office's abbreviation for the temporary emergency custody orders of August 12, 2026. On October 6, 2026, the day of the hearing, her office recorded: "Message to KP re hearing outcome, psych evaluation, and proposed order" (entry 255). The order drafted on October 5

was the order she asked the court to sign on October 14 and the court signed on October 15.

118. On October 14, 2026, Plaintiff applied ex parte for an order directing Vincent Hyler to appear and for J.J.'s return under the February 11, 2026 order. Her application sought enforcement of that order. On its filing, the court was required to order Vincent Hyler to appear in person with J.J. at a hearing on the next judicial day after service (Cal. Fam. Code § 3448(c)), and to order J.J.'s immediate return to Plaintiff unless Vincent Hyler established one of the narrow defenses the statute lists (Cal. Fam. Code § 3450(a)). The same day, Defendant Perkins declared under penalty of perjury that at the hearing on October 6, 2026, "the Court orally ordered on the record that all temporary orders remain in effect," and that her client "does not request that the Court record an extension as having been made on a date when no such ruling occurred." Her declaration identifies no ruling on September 15. Her opposition, which she signed the same day, states that on October 6 "Petitioner's counsel had a written Order available providing for extension of the August 12, 2026 Order, however the Court made an oral

ruling rather than sign the Order"; that "Petitioner does not request an extension backdated to a date on which no extension was made"; and that "Petitioner requests the Court sign the attached Order which continues the August 12, 2026 TECO Order."

119. On October 15, 2026, the court signed the order Defendant Perkins's office had prepared, captioned "[PROPOSED] ORDER EXTENDING AUGUST 12, 2026 TEMPORARY EMERGENCY CUSTODY ORDERS." It states: "On September 15, 2026, in Department C, the Court extended the August 12 Orders pending the evidentiary hearing set for December 9, 2026. That ruling was not reflected in the minute order." It orders that the August 12 orders "were extended by the Court at the continued hearing on September 15, 2026," that they "have remained in full force and effect without interruption since August 12, 2026," and that "The minute order for September 15, 2026 is corrected." Defendant Perkins's sworn declaration and her opposition of October 14 place the extension on October 6 and identify no ruling on September 15. The order she submitted, signed the next day, places it on September 15. The court's register for

October 15, 2026, records "Order FOR IMMEDIATE CUSTODY DENIED," records Plaintiff's ex parte application as "DENIED," and records the order Defendant Perkins submitted as signed at 2:07 p.m. No hearing under section 3448(c) was held, and J.J. was not returned. Defendant Perkins has given still other accounts of the same extension. Her Exhibit R, paragraph 12, places it on October 6, 2026, "nunc pro tunc." Her form FL-320, paragraph 7, attributes it to a continuance ("due to continuance"). Her memorandum states that J.J. was held "under this Court's order throughout," citing her Exhibits J and K, which state that the August 12 orders expired on September 2, 2026. The order she submitted recites a continuance "until Spetember 25 … at Respondent's request" [sic], while the court's minutes set the continued hearing for September 15 and give Plaintiff's challenge for disqualification as the reason. One extension; several incompatible accounts, all hers. The court's register now marks the evidentiary hearing set for December 9, 2026 "Canceled — Vacated." No evidentiary hearing has been held on the order of August 12, 2026.

120. On October 23, 2026, Plaintiff asked Defendant Perkins twice in writing where J.J. is. The reply did not say.

121. On October 26, 2026, Judith Hyler was personally served at 9501 Laughlin Way, and Vincent Hyler through her, with the summons and complaint in No. 26CV04599. The same day, Defendant Perkins filed a request that Plaintiff be ordered to pay Vincent Hyler's attorney's fees and costs as a sanction under California Family Code section 271. It asked for $36,071.58. As amended on November 17, 2026, it asks for $33,818.85.

122. The invoices Defendant Perkins filed in support of that request the next day, October 27, 2026, state that Vincent Hyler's account showed a "Total Amount Outstanding" of $12,392.85 and an "Amount in Trust" of $890.00; that invoices 701 and 767, due October 5 and October 18, 2026, were unpaid; and that interest had been charged on overdue invoices 576, 644, 701 and 767. The invoices read: "Please make all amounts payable to: Perkins Family Law, PC." In the declaration she signed on October 23, 2026, and filed with those invoices, Defendant Perkins described her Exhibit O as "the order of the Florida Sixth District Court of Appeal entered denying the petition in

No. 6D2026-2448." Exhibit O is an order of October 15, 2026, granting Plaintiff an extension of time to pay the filing fee. It denies nothing. In her amended declaration of November 17, 2026, Defendant Perkins wrote: "My declaration executed October 23, 2026 stated that each had been denied. That was incorrect as to No. 6D2026-2448, which was then pending."

123. On October 27, 2026, Plaintiff served Defendant Perkins with a motion for sanctions under California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 identifying statements in that fee request that had no evidentiary support. On November 17, 2026, Defendant Perkins served an amended memorandum and amended declaration. The amended memorandum states that it "narrows or withdraws several statements" and "replaces the redacted invoices with an itemized schedule of the fees requested" — Exhibit M, quoted in this complaint. It asks the court to make Plaintiff pay for the entries assigned to ground H, and cites, for the incident reports, an "Exh. GG" that is not among the exhibits she filed.

124. At 12:11 p.m. Pacific time on November 17, 2026, fifty-five minutes before those amended papers were served on her, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant

Perkins and to Colin Morrow, counsel for Vincent Hyler, Judith Hyler and Michael Hyler in No. 26CV04599, that she anticipated filing a federal civil action arising from events between August 12 and October 26, 2026. She asked that their clients preserve all communications with "Deputy Brian Aigner, Lieutenant Chapman, Investigator Mariano Guzman, the Lee County Sheriff's Office, the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office and the Mendocino County District Attorney's Office," and that Defendant Perkins "likewise preserve your office's communications with those individuals and offices, and with the Mendocino Superior Court and its staff, concerning this matter, including the proposed order signed October 15, 2026, and related calendars, call logs and billing entries."

125. On November 18, 2026, at 1:01 p.m. Pacific time, about twenty-five hours after Plaintiff's preservation letter, Defendant Perkins wrote to Plaintiff that Exhibit M "inadvertently included billing entries with the work descriptions unredacted." She demanded that Plaintiff not "use, quote, summarize, or refer to the unredacted descriptions, or anything learned from them, in any filing, hearing, or communication in this case, in any appellate

or Supreme Court proceeding, in any Florida proceeding, or anywhere else"; that Plaintiff tell her who had received them; and that Plaintiff "Delete or destroy every copy of the November 17, 2026 amended declaration and exhibits in your possession, including the email attachment, downloads, and printouts, once you receive the corrected version described below." The letter stated that if Plaintiff did not confirm compliance, "or if the unredacted descriptions are used in any way, Petitioner will seek a protective order, an order excluding the material and anything derived from it, and sanctions." The day before, Defendant Perkins had sworn that Exhibit M's descriptions "appear as billed, except that eleven are partly redacted."

126. At 1:16 p.m. Pacific time on November 18, 2026, Plaintiff sent Defendant Perkins written notice of this action and a demand to preserve evidence. At 2:00 p.m. Pacific time, Plaintiff wrote back that she would not destroy any copy. At 2:15 p.m. Pacific time, she answered each demand in the letter in writing.

127. Also on November 18, 2026, twenty-three days after the State of Florida gave notice that it would file no information, Defendant Perkins

signed and served in No. 25FL01030 an opposition stating that Plaintiff "faces pending felony charges in Lee County for terroristic threats." Her declaration in support, executed November 17, 2026, attaches at paragraph 6, as Exhibit 4, a Lee County docket printed "10/21/26, 10:47 AM," and swears that it is a docket "charging Respondent with 'THREAT-- TERRORISTIC', a second degree felony." She signed that oath twenty-two days after the State's notice that it would not file a charge, which was e-filed on October 26, 2026.

128. This action was filed on November 19, 2026. The same day, Defendant Perkins applied ex parte in No. 25FL01030 for an order sealing Exhibit M and the parts of Plaintiff's declaration of November 18, 2026, that quote it, and for a protective order. Her declaration in support, signed under penalty of perjury, states that "the amended papers describe Exhibit M as redacted for privilege," and that "No destruction of copies or identification of recipients is requested." Her letter of the day before had asked for both. The declaration also states: "Upon compiling the amended declaration exhibits, the wrong file which was unredacted was inadvertently attached as Exhibit M," and calls this "a clerical error." Two days earlier she had sworn that the

descriptions in Exhibit M "appear as billed, except that eleven are partly redacted," and the Exhibit M she filed carries those partial redactions. The proposed order she submitted provides that Plaintiff "shall not publicly file the protected descriptions or rely on them on the merits in this action unless authorized by further order." The sealing papers were served on Plaintiff at 9:58 a.m. Pacific time. The declaration among them states: "On November 19, 2026, my office filed and served a Corrected Amended Declaration with the descriptions in Exhibit M redacted." The Corrected Amended Declaration was served on Plaintiff at 12:57 p.m. Pacific time. Plaintiff has preserved Exhibit M as it was served on her on November 17, 2026.

N. J.J. is kept from his mother

129. Since August 19, 2026, J.J. has been kept from Plaintiff. No Defendant has told her the address where he lives. Plaintiff asked in writing: Vincent Hyler's Florida lawyer, Mr. Mead, on August 21 and 22, 2026, and Defendant Perkins on August 31 and October 23, 2026. None of those requests was answered with the address.

130. Plaintiff believes, and on that basis alleges, that J.J. has been kept at 9501 Laughlin Way, Judith Hyler's property, since August 2026.

131. On July 6, 2026, Vincent Hyler's memorandum, filed by Defendant Perkins, represented to the Mendocino court that during his visitation "there would be a family member present, Petitioner's mother or father, at all times." Plaintiff believes, and on that basis alleges, that since August 2026 Michael Hyler and Judith Hyler have kept J.J. in their home with Vincent Hyler and have joined in keeping from Plaintiff where J.J. is and how he is.

132. Exhibit M records that the Perkins Defendants' call with Defendant Guzman on September 29, 2026, followed up on a "clients message" regarding the "2nd welfare check" (entry 194). Plaintiff believes, and on that basis alleges, that Judith Hyler and Michael Hyler took part in the communications with Vincent Hyler's lawyer that preceded that call. Plaintiff identifies this allegation as one likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery of those communications. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).

133. On November 16, 2026, Plaintiff asked in writing to see J.J. in person. Defendant Perkins refused in writing the same evening: "Your request for in-person visitation is denied because the current order does not allow you any in person visitation with JJ. Our client will comply with the current order unless and until it is modified by the court. JJ is receiving care and doing well." Five months earlier, according to Defendant Perkins's own memorandum of July 6, 2026, the Mendocino court had issued, on June 11, 2026, a temporary emergency (ex parte) order requiring Plaintiff to make J.J. available to Vincent Hyler for visitation in Florida from June 17 through June 24, 2026.

134. On November 19, 2026, Defendant Perkins served on Plaintiff a declaration of Vincent Hyler, signed November 17, 2026, which states: "J.J. lives with me in Mendocino County and remains safe and well cared for. I would like to keep the residential address confidential to avoid the risk of harassment by Respondent." It states that J.J. receives services "through Redwood Coast Regional Center and his medical providers," and that those services "began at the earliest dates available after J.J. was placed with me."

It gives no address and no date. The opposition Defendant Perkins signed on November 18, 2026, and served with that declaration states: "Petitioner asks that the court not order disclosure of J.J.'s residential address."

135. The application that opposition answered was Plaintiff's request of November 17, 2026, for temporary emergency orders. The order she proposed reads: "Within 24 hours of this order, Petitioner shall tell Respondent where J.J. is living and confirm his health and well-being." The court's register records that request as denied on November 19, 2026.

O. The judges and the officers who administer the two courts

136. The judge who signed the order of August 12, 2026, and the order of October 15, 2026, is Defendant McCurry. The Lee County judge who signed the warrant of August 19, 2026, the order of August 27, 2026, and the orders of September 18 and September 24, 2026, in Nos. 26-DR-005826 and 26-DR-006457, is Defendant Adams. Exhibit M records that on August 12, 2026, Defendant Perkins personally recorded "receipt of approved teco, review and send to FL attorney and client for fu" (entry 44). The judge who on September 2, 2026, denied Plaintiff's application to be told where J.J. was is Defendant

Pekin. On September 9, 2026, at 2:49 p.m., Defendant Pekin wrote on Plaintiff's proposed order and warrant under California Family Code sections 3448 and 3451: "DENIED, this motion was denied on 9-4-26. It was not rejected for failure to pay a fee." The register lists no order entered on September 4, 2026. The clerk's own notice of September 4, 2026, at 7:48 p.m. Eastern time, had returned those papers unfiled: "NO FEES PAID NO FEE WAIVER IN CASE." They were refiled at the counter on September 9, 2026, with the fee. These are the orders the other offices gave as their reason. Defendant Guzman told Plaintiff on September 8, 2026, "The judge has already made an order." The Office of the State Attorney wrote that "This is a civil matter being handled in the court system."

137. The warrant Defendant Adams signed on August 19, 2026, recites Plaintiff's residence address. That address was confidential in the Lee County court's own files under Florida Family Law Form 12.980(h). Judge Sloan's temporary injunction of July 6, 2026, was in the same court's files, and it was inside Vincent Hyler's own August 12 filing. No order Defendant Adams signed on August 19, August 27, September 18, or September 24, 2026,

mentions that injunction, the confidential address, or J.J.'s medical condition. Section 61.534, Florida Statutes, permits a court to issue a warrant to take physical custody of a child only if it finds, "upon the testimony of the petitioner or other witness," that the child is likely "to imminently suffer serious physical harm or removal from this state," and requires the warrant to "[r]ecite the facts upon which a conclusion of imminent serious physical harm or removal from the jurisdiction is based." When Plaintiff asked Defendant Adams's chambers for a hearing on August 22 and 24, 2026, chambers answered: "All requests for emergency or expedited hearings must be submitted to Judge Adams either by US mail or hand delivery."

138. On September 11, 2026, Plaintiff filed in the Circuit Court for Lee County, No. 26-DR-006457, a verified petition to enforce the February 11, 2026 order and an application for a warrant to take physical custody of J.J. (Filing 256910952). On September 17, 2026, the case was transferred to Defendant Adams. On September 18, 2026, she signed a memorandum (Filing 257405870) stating that Plaintiff's motions "do not meet the statutory requirements for expedited enforcement," that "no current order has been

provided and no proper registration request has been made," and that "the last California order according to the Petitioner's Pleadings extends the placement of the child" with Vincent Hyler. Plaintiff's pleadings stated that no written extension existed. Section 61.531(3), Florida Statutes, provides that the court "shall" issue an order to appear. No order to appear issued. No hearing was held. Plaintiff's application for a warrant has not been ruled on.

139. On September 23, 2026, at 10:46 a.m., Defendant Adams, signing as Administrative Family Judge, entered an Order of Reassignment in No. 26-DR-006457: "THE ABOVE STYLED CASE is hereby reassigned to the Honorable Elisabeth Adams, Judge of said Court" (Filing 257661477). The next day, at 2:33 p.m., she signed the memorandum holding Plaintiff's enforcement action in abeyance. It states: "The orders sought to be enforced are still pending with the California court, which has complete jurisdiction over the child." The February 11, 2026 order is not pending in any court. The memorandum recites no communication with the California court. At 3:11 p.m. that day Plaintiff moved to disqualify Defendant Adams (Filing 257804382). On September 29, 2026, an "Order Denying Motion" was entered

in No. 26-DR-006457 (Filing 258113231). The registration of the February 11, 2026 order was confirmed as a matter of law on October 16, 2026. No order to appear has issued, the abeyance has not been lifted, and no Lee County judge has heard Plaintiff.

140. The two applications in No. 25FL01030 stand side by side on the court's own register. On August 12, 2026, Vincent Hyler asked for temporary physical custody of J.J. The register records the declaration regarding notice as "NOTICE NOT GIVEN." The order was signed the same day. On November 17, 2026, Plaintiff asked to be told where J.J. is living and for daytime visits on the terms the February 11, 2026 order gave Vincent Hyler. She gave notice. Defendant Perkins's declaration of November 18, 2026, states: "I received notice of this ex parte application on November 17 at 9:31am by email." The register records Plaintiff's request as denied. The practice did not begin on September 2, 2026. On April 22, 2025, in No. 25FL01030, Defendant Pekin noted Plaintiff's pending request for a domestic-violence restraining order and set the custody matter to be heard with it. The minutes of July 3, 2025 describe that day as an "Evidentiary

Hearing on both custody & visitation and request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order." Section 3044(g) of the Family Code provides that "[i]n an evidentiary hearing or trial in which custody orders are sought and where there has been an allegation of domestic violence, the court shall make a determination as to whether this section applies prior to issuing a custody order," unless the court finds that a continuance is necessary to make that determination. No court reporter was available. Counsel were sent into chambers, off the record, from 10:39 a.m. to 2:58 p.m.; the settlement that came out of that room was approved at 4:01 p.m.; and the minutes contain no such determination and no finding that a continuance was necessary to make one. The finding that raises the presumption may be made by "a court, whether that court hears or has heard the child custody proceedings or not." Cal. Fam. Code § 3044(d)(2). The ex parte orders of June 11, 2026 and August 12, 2026 were made without the determination, the second with the Lee County finding of July 6, 2026 in Vincent Hyler's own exhibits. Section 3064 of the Family Code directs the court to "refrain from making an order granting or modifying a custody order on an ex parte basis unless there has

been a showing of immediate harm to the child or immediate risk that the child will be removed from the State of California," and, in deciding whether immediate harm has been shown, to "consider a parent's illegal access to firearms and ammunition." The order of August 12, 2026 gave custody, ex parte, to the parent whose unsurrendered firearm is described in paragraph 41. Since J.J. was taken on August 19, 2026, the same court has had the question before it on six further occasions — September 2, 9 and 15, October 6 and 15, and November 9, 2026 — together with the question whether the August 12 orders remained in force. On five of those occasions Plaintiff's application was denied or her statement struck; on the sixth, October 6, 2026, the court made the oral extension described in paragraph 118. On none of them was either question decided in a written ruling with reasons. No determination under section 3044 of the Family Code has been made by any court in either Mendocino case at any time since they were filed in March 2025, and what began as an omission has become, since August 19, 2026, the keeping of a child from his mother on orders made without it.

141. The document posted on the register under the entry of November 19, 2026, is Plaintiff's own proposed order. Its date line and its line for the signature of a judicial officer are blank. No order signed by a judge, no minutes, and no statement of reasons has been served on Plaintiff. The register carries this note on Plaintiff's filing of November 17, 2026: "EX PARTE INFO SHEET WAS NOT SERVED OR RESERVED." The register, and the documents posted on it, are kept by the Clerk's office that Defendant Turner administers. On November 3, 2026, Plaintiff's second verified statement of disqualification of Defendant McCurry was filed on paper at that office, and was served on Defendant Turner, as Court Executive Officer, at 1:30 p.m., as agent for Defendant McCurry.

142. On November 20, 2026, Plaintiff wrote to the court's ex parte desk asking for the signed order on her request of November 17, 2026.

143. On August 31, 2026, Plaintiff filed a verified statement of disqualification of Defendant McCurry. On September 10, 2026, he struck it himself. On November 3, 2026, she served a second. On November 9, 2026, he struck that one himself, in a document that attached his own verified answer.

In that answer he swore that on September 15, 2026, he "ordered all existing orders extended." The clerk's minutes of September 15, 2026, record the appointment of the Public Defender, a continuance, and a new date for the order to show cause. They record no extension.

144. On September 11, 2026, Plaintiff lodged a written request to the Presiding Judge to reassign the case. The register records it as "REQUEST TO THE PRESIDING JUDGE." No response appears on the register. On October 14, 2026, Plaintiff wrote to the Presiding Judge again, under rule 10.603 of the California Rules of Court. No reply was received. The Presiding Judge is Defendant Dolan.

145. On September 18 and September 24, 2026, Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Porter, through his office, about Nos. 26-DR-005826 and 26-DR-006457. Her letter of September 24, 2026, at 4:08 p.m., reported that Defendant Adams had entered an order that day in No. 26-DR-006457, the day after the Order of Reassignment of September 23, 2026 (Filing 257661477); stated that the order to appear required by section 61.531(3), Florida Statutes, had not issued in thirteen days; and asked that the

assigned judge be asked to take up that order and the pending warrant application. On September 28, 2026, Defendant Porter answered by signed letter, sent through his judicial assistant, copied to Mr. Mead, and filed the same day in No. 26-DR-006457 as "Judiciary Correspondence" (Filing 257965572). The letter states that his role "is administrative in nature"; that he is "ethically prohibited from intervening on behalf of a party in cases pending before other judges"; that the assignment of the case is "information that you can confirm yourself upon review of the case files maintained by the Lee County Clerk"; and that "adequate and appropriate remedies can be found within the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure." It does not mention the order to appear, the warrant application, or the child. No order to appear has issued since. By administrative order of the Chief Judge of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, Defendant Adams is "Administrative Judge for the Circuit Family Division," "through December 31, 2026, or until further order of this Court." The Circuit's assignment order for the Lee County circuit divisions provides: "NO case shall be specifically assigned or reassigned without a written order issued by the Chief Judge or Administrative Judge."

P. Harm

146. As a direct result of the acts alleged, Plaintiff has been deprived of her custody of her son, and has lost his care and companionship, since August 19, 2026. Before that day, she had arranged his care for his developmental delays: three therapy sessions a week, two of occupational therapy and one through Florida's Early Steps program, with a daily home program and pediatric care. Since then, she has been kept from his care, and the care she arranged for him in Florida stopped. She has not been told where he sleeps.

147. She admitted deputies into her home and her bedroom on being told the visit was a welfare check; was held in a locked car in the cold; made to unlock her telephone; arrested; booked; held for days, immunocompromised, in a cold cell; put before a judge with the highest bail in the room; released only because her parents could pay; fitted with an ankle monitor that stayed on after the State declined to charge her; and separated from her telephone, which the Sheriff's Office still holds. Her arrest was broadcast on local television. The account from which she had petitioned every agency for help became the object of legal process.

148. She has suffered severe emotional distress and harm to her health. She has spent money and time on proceedings in two states to locate her son and to answer the proceedings brought against her. She continues to suffer these harms every day J.J. is kept from her.

VII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff pleads eight counts. Counts I through IV, VII and VIII arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts V and VI arise under Florida law and are brought against the Perkins Defendants only. Count VII is brought against the Judicial Defendants and the Court Administration Defendants only, for a declaratory judgment. Count VIII is brought for the night of September 29 and 30, 2026. In Counts I and II, "individual Defendants" means the Defendants sued in their individual capacities. Plaintiff's claims under Florida law arising from that night, including any claim for malicious prosecution, and her claims against the Sheriff arising from it, will be brought by amendment when the Lee County Sheriff's Office has produced its records of that night. Plaintiff does not now plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). She does not now plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which

requires "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action," *Griffin v. Breckenridge*, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). She reserves the right to seek leave to add either.

COUNT I — 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Fourteenth Amendment, deprivation of Plaintiff's custody of her son and of the right to familial association, without due process of law (against all individual Defendants and the Perkins Defendants)

149. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 148.

150. A parent has a liberty interest, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in the care, custody, and control of her child. *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion). That interest includes a parent and child living together without governmental interference.

151. Plaintiff's interest is not abstract. She held, and holds, the order of the Mendocino County Superior Court of February 11, 2026, awarding her sole physical custody of J.J. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment forbade depriving her of that custody without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Defendants deprived her of it on an order obtained without notice to her, carried out in her own home on a warrant that deferred any service on her until J.J. was secured, and have kept J.J. from her ever since, without her ever having been heard before the deprivation.

152. Defendants Aigner, Guzman, and Chapman acted under color of state law. Vincent Hyler, Judith Hyler, Michael Hyler, and the Perkins Defendants acted under color of state law because they were willful participants in joint action with state officials. *Dennis v. Sparks*, 449 U.S. 24, 27–28 (1980). After hearing from Vincent Hyler's side, Defendant Guzman adopted their position as his own and closed Plaintiff's report: "The father has custody." Defendant Chapman then adopted Defendant Guzman's position and told Plaintiff the Sheriff's Office would do nothing; the welfare check that followed, recorded by the Perkins Defendants as the "2nd welfare check with Lt. Chapman," was reported to Vincent Hyler's lawyer and to Defendant Guzman, not to Plaintiff. Defendant Aigner, the deputy who took J.J., became Vincent Hyler's noticed, subpoenaed and prepared witness on the day J.J.

was in Ukiah, and then refused to enter J.J. as a missing child. The Perkins Defendants arranged each of those contacts, by their own sworn account.

153. By the acts alleged, Defendants intentionally deprived Plaintiff of her relationship with her son. Those acts include obtaining a no-notice retrieval order on a sworn firearm statement contradicted by Vincent Hyler's own receipt; taking J.J. out of Florida in violation of paragraph 8 of the warrant, before any order allowed it; refusing to enter J.J. as a missing child; telling Plaintiff that nothing would be done, and withholding from her the result of the welfare check that followed; and keeping J.J. from his mother and concealing where he is. Each was done with the agreement and assistance of the state-actor Defendants.

154. The Perkins Defendants' part in the deprivation, each act recorded in their own filed papers, was: (a) presenting the August 12 application without notice to Plaintiff, on Defendant Perkins's own sworn declaration; (b) presenting as concealment a confidentiality designation in a domestic-violence proceeding, when their client's declaration stated he had Plaintiff's address; (c) telling the court that the firearm-surrender directive "has been

complied with," with a receipt that lists no shotgun; (d) sending the signed order to Vincent Hyler's Florida lawyer for use in Lee County; (e) arranging, subpoenaing and preparing Defendant Aigner as Vincent Hyler's witness; (f) communicating with Defendant Guzman on September 3 and September 29, 2026, about Plaintiff's reports; and (g) preparing on October 5, and submitting on October 14 and 15, 2026, the order stating that the August 12 orders had been extended on September 15.

155. The part of each other Defendant in the deprivation, each from the facts alleged above, was: (a) Vincent Hyler: swearing on August 12, 2026 that he had surrendered the firearm, with a receipt that shows he had not (paragraph 41); applying without notice to Plaintiff (paragraphs 59 and 60); presenting the confidential address in Plaintiff's domestic-violence filings as concealment while his own declaration stated he had her address, at which the warrant was then executed (paragraph 63); receiving J.J. in Lee County on August 19, 2026 (paragraph 68); taking J.J. out of Florida before the order of August 27, 2026 allowed it (paragraphs 71 and 72); reporting Plaintiff's contacts with law enforcement to his lawyer, who recorded them as "false

police report[s]" (paragraph 88); and keeping J.J.'s address from Plaintiff, and asking the court through counsel not to order its disclosure (paragraphs 129 and 134). (b) Judith Hyler: keeping J.J. at her residence and declining to return him on March 16, 2025 (paragraph 50); carrying him out of Plaintiff's home on March 20, 2025 (paragraph 52); being the supervisor the February 11, 2026 order named for Vincent Hyler's visits (paragraph 53); keeping J.J. at 9501 Laughlin Way since August 2026 and joining in keeping his whereabouts from Plaintiff, on information and belief (paragraphs 130 and 131); and taking part in the communications with Vincent Hyler's lawyer that preceded the call of September 29, 2026, on information and belief (paragraph 132). (c) Michael Hyler: paying for Vincent Hyler's drinking (paragraph 42); being represented to the Mendocino court on July 6, 2026 as the family member who, with Judith Hyler, would be present "at all times" during Vincent Hyler's visitation (paragraph 131); retaining counsel jointly with Vincent Hyler and Judith Hyler on November 9, 2026 (paragraph 22); and keeping J.J. in his home and joining in keeping his whereabouts from Plaintiff, on information and belief (paragraphs 131 and 132). (d) Defendant

Aigner: taking J.J. from Plaintiff's home on August 19, 2026, and refusing three times to take his medical information (paragraph 67); writing a report of unsupported observations about Plaintiff that Vincent Hyler then used against her (paragraph 69); becoming Vincent Hyler's noticed, subpoenaed and prepared witness from August 26, 2026 (paragraphs 74 through 79); refusing on September 11, 2026 to take a missing-child report, telling Plaintiff "He's not missing" and "There's no crime" (paragraph 94); and being at Plaintiff's door on the night of September 29, 2026 (paragraph 104). (e) Defendant Guzman: speaking with Vincent Hyler's lawyer on September 3, 2026 about Plaintiff's report (paragraph 84); telling Plaintiff on September 8, 2026 that "The father has custody," that she was "incorrect" that the order had expired, and that there was "nothing to do with this case" (paragraphs 86 and 87); receiving the results of the welfare checks that were never given to Plaintiff (paragraph 93); and speaking with Vincent Hyler's lawyer's office on September 29, 2026 about a restraining order and criminal charges against Plaintiff, and undertaking to "reach out to Sheriff's office" (paragraph 102). (f) Defendant Chapman: telling Plaintiff on September 28, 2026, after speaking

with Defendant Guzman, that the Sheriff's Office "would not be doing anything either" and was "taking the same position as the District Attorney's Office," calling the recorded death threat and the unsurrendered firearm "things that happened in the past," and refusing to give his first name (paragraph 92); and conducting a welfare check whose result went to Vincent Hyler's lawyer and not to Plaintiff (paragraph 93).

156. Defendants acted intentionally, or with reckless indifference to Plaintiff's rights.

COUNT II — 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of her constitutional rights (against all individual Defendants and the Perkins Defendants)

157. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 148.

158. Defendants reached an understanding to deprive Plaintiff of her rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The understanding is shown by the dated sequence alleged above:

(a) the plan Vincent Hyler stated on March 15, 2025: "all I have to do is call the cops … you don't have to take the boy with you … I've done my homework"; "you're not in this county with any judges";

(b) the no-notice order of August 12, 2026, obtained on his firearm perjury, prepared and filed by the Perkins Defendants five days after Defendant Perkins's call with his Florida lawyer, and followed the same day by her office's "next steps for domestication";

(c) the taking of August 19, 2026, in Lee County, on a warrant that deferred any service on Plaintiff until J.J. was secured, recorded by the Perkins Defendants the same day as "retrieval of child!";

(d) J.J. in Ukiah on August 26, in violation of paragraph 8 of the warrant, before the travel order of August 27, with Defendant Perkins recording the same day information from her client about a doctor's visit;

(e) the same deputy noticed, subpoenaed and prepared as Vincent Hyler's witness by the Perkins Defendants between August 26 and

September 1, through calls into the Lee County Sheriff's Office and to the deputy himself;

(f) the investigator speaking with Vincent Hyler's lawyer on September 3 and then declaring "The father has custody" to Plaintiff on September 8;

(g) the Perkins Defendants recording Plaintiff's reports as "false police report[s]" on September 8, beginning a sanctions motion on September 9, and gathering police records about her, with a noted follow-up with the District Attorney, through September 23;

(h) the same deputy refusing to enter J.J. as missing on September 11;

(i) the Sheriff's lieutenant "taking the same position as the District Attorney's Office" on September 28;

(j) the results of the welfare checks going to Vincent Hyler's lawyer and to Defendant Guzman, and never to Plaintiff;

(k) the Perkins Defendants' call with Defendant Guzman on September 29 about a restraining order and criminal charges against Plaintiff, and his undertaking to "reach out to Sheriff's office";

(l) the arrest of Plaintiff that evening, the evening after her sworn complaints against Vincent Hyler and Judith Hyler were sent, with the same deputy at her door;

(m) Defendant Perkins's demand of November 18, 2026, about twenty-five hours after Plaintiff asked her to preserve them, that Plaintiff destroy every copy of the records that document these communications; and

(n) on information and belief, a relative of the Hyler family, Jack Woida, inside the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office throughout.

159. Plaintiff believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Judicial Defendants and the Court Administration Defendants took part in that understanding by the acts and omissions alleged in Part O. On this Count she seeks damages from the individual Defendants and the Perkins Defendants. Against the Judicial Defendants and the Court Administration Defendants she seeks the declaration asked for in Count VII.

160. Each Defendant shared the common objective of keeping J.J. from his mother and silencing her complaints, and each committed at least one

overt act in furtherance of it, as alleged above. Each Defendant's overt acts are those stated for that Defendant in paragraphs 154 and 155.

161. The Perkins Defendants' own sworn time records document the communications among the private and public participants: with the Lee County Sheriff's Office, its captain on duty, its court liaison and its records department, and with the deputy whose appearance they arranged, subpoenaed and prepared, before the September 2 hearing; with the District Attorney's investigator about Plaintiff's report that J.J. had been taken, on September 3; a noted follow-up with the District Attorney, on September 17; with the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office and the Ukiah Police Department for records about Plaintiff, in September and October; and with Defendant Guzman, on September 29, about a restraining order against Plaintiff and about criminal charges against her, with Defendant Guzman confirming he would reach out to the Sheriff's Office.

162. The conspiracy caused the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights described in Count I and the harms alleged above.

COUNT III — 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Fourteenth Amendment, conditions of confinement of a pretrial detainee (against Does 1–10 and Defendant Marceno, official capacity)

163. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 148.

164. From the night of September 29–30, 2026, until her release, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee in the Lee County jail, and the Fourteenth Amendment forbade punishing her or holding her in conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious harm to her health.

165. Plaintiff is immunocompromised. She was held in a cell kept cold enough that she was freezing for the days she was there, and her basic needs were not met. Those conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm to her, and the Doe Defendants responsible for her confinement knew of or recklessly disregarded that risk and took no reasonable step to abate it.

166. On information and belief, the conditions in which Plaintiff was held were the customary conditions of the Lee County jail, maintained or tolerated by the Sheriff as final policymaker for the jail, such that the Sheriff's custom was the moving force behind the deprivation.

COUNT IV — 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Liability of the Sheriff of Lee County (against Defendant Marceno, official capacity)

167. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 148.

168. A local government is liable under § 1983 when execution of its policy or custom inflicts the injury; it is not liable solely because it employs a wrongdoer. *Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978). The deprivations of Plaintiff's rights were caused by the policy or custom of the Lee County Sheriff's Office, and were ratified by its policymakers, in that: (a) the office refused, in writing, to enter J.J. as a missing child despite a sworn report under § 937.021, Florida Statutes, which provides that a law enforcement agency "may not require a reporter to present an order that a child be taken into custody or any other such order before accepting a report that a child is missing"; (b) the office received eleven written complaints between September 11 and September 28, 2026, two addressed to the Sheriff by name, naming the responding deputy, each asking that the refusal be put in writing if it stood; its lieutenant answered on September 11 that the matter was "civil in nature" and that there was "no additional action to be

taken"; it refused the papers Plaintiff's process server brought on September 14; and it answered nothing in writing after September 11, 2026; and (c) the office held her, immunocompromised, in a cold cell for days under conditions that were its ordinary conditions. Federal law requires each State and local law enforcement agency to report each case of a missing child reported to it to the National Crime Information Center. 34 U.S.C. § 41307(a). Sheriff Marceno was told of the refusal in writing, twice by name, and it was not changed. The office's conduct on the night of September 29–30, 2026, alleged in Part K, is pleaded as fact; Plaintiff's claims against the Sheriff arising from it will be brought by amendment when the Sheriff's Office produces its records of that night.

COUNT V — Florida law: intentional interference with the custodial parent–child relationship (against the Perkins Defendants)

169. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 148.

170. Florida recognizes a claim by a parent against a person who is not the child's parent for intentional interference with the custodial parent–child relationship. "The elements of the cause of action include that the plaintiff

had superior custody rights to the child and that the defendant intentionally interfered with those rights." *Stone v. Wall*, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1042 (Fla. 1999).

171. Plaintiff had superior custody rights to J.J. She holds the order of February 11, 2026, awarding her sole physical custody, which the Mendocino court called the standing order on May 26, 2026, which Defendant Perkins herself called "valid and enforceable" that day, and which was registered in Lee County without contest. The only order under which J.J. was taken from her, the no-notice order of August 12, 2026, states in print that it expires at the hearing of September 2, 2026, unless extended by court order. The minutes of September 2, 2026, record no extension. The Lee County warrant states that it expires with the California order at that hearing "unless proof of a written extension is presented." No written order extending the August 12 orders existed until October 15, 2026.

172. The Perkins Defendants are not J.J.'s parents.

173. The Perkins Defendants intentionally interfered with Plaintiff's custody of J.J. Their acts, described above, include acts outside any courtroom: conferring with Vincent Hyler's Florida lawyer on August 7, 2026,

five days before the no-notice application; sending him certified copies of the August 12 order by Federal Express on August 13, 2026, for use against Plaintiff in Lee County; telephoning the Lee County Sheriff's Office, its court liaison, its captain on duty and its records department about the deputy who had taken J.J.; e-mailing and telephoning that deputy to prepare him as Vincent Hyler's witness; speaking with the District Attorney's investigator assigned to Plaintiff's report that J.J. had been taken, on September 3, 2026, five days before he told Plaintiff "The father has custody," and again on September 29, 2026, about a restraining order and criminal charges against her; answering Plaintiff's written requests of October 23, 2026, without telling her where her son is; and refusing on November 16, 2026, her request to see him. They also include preparing on October 5, 2026, the order signed on October 15, 2026, which states that the August 12 orders were extended on a date that Defendant Perkins's own sworn declaration of October 14, 2026, does not identify.

174. The Perkins Defendants acted with knowledge of Plaintiff's rights. Defendant Perkins's own letter of May 26, 2026, calls the February 11, 2026

order "valid and enforceable." Her own memorandum of August 12, 2026, states that J.J. "already lawfully left California under the Judgment." Her own time entry of August 26, 2026, records information from her client about a doctor's visit on the day J.J. was at a clinic in Ukiah, the day before any order allowed him to leave Florida. Her own time entry for September 15, 2026, records no extension of the August 12 orders.

175. As a direct result, Plaintiff has been deprived of the custody, care and companionship of her son since August 19, 2026, and has suffered the harms alleged in Part P.

COUNT VI — Florida law: defamation per se, false statements to law-enforcement officers (against the Perkins Defendants)

176. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 148.

177. By their own time records, the Perkins Defendants spoke about Plaintiff with law-enforcement officers outside any court proceeding. On September 3, 2026, Defendant Perkins spoke by telephone with Defendant Guzman about Plaintiff's report that J.J. had been taken (entries 151 and 153). On September 29, 2026, her office spoke with him again, about "a

restraining order against Heller" and about "criminal charges for false reporting against Heller" (entry 194). On September 30 and October 1, 2026, Defendant Perkins recorded Plaintiff's requests for a welfare check on J.J. as "harassment by OPP," a "request for fu w/ Guzman re: same," and "fu comm re: comm w/ DA and sheriff's office" (entries 199 and 205).

178. Plaintiff believes, and on that basis alleges, that in those communications Defendant Perkins and her office told Defendant Guzman, and through him or directly the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office, in substance, that Plaintiff's reports that J.J. had been taken out of Florida and was being kept from her were false police reports, and that her requests for a welfare check on J.J. were harassment; and that they raised with him whether Plaintiff should be restrained or charged with false reporting. Plaintiff identifies this allegation as one likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery of those communications. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3). Its basis is the Perkins Defendants' own entries describing Plaintiff's reports as "false police report[s]" (entries 157 and 158) and her requests as "harassment" (entry 199); the subjects of the September 29 call as

their own entry records them; and what Defendant Guzman and Defendant Chapman then told Plaintiff: "Because they've told me you have not," "there's nothing to do with this case," and that the Sheriff's Office was "taking the same position as the District Attorney's Office."

179. Those statements were false. Plaintiff's reports were true, as alleged in Part I.

180. Those statements imputed to Plaintiff the commission of a crime, the making of false reports to law enforcement, and are actionable without proof of special damages.

181. The Perkins Defendants made those statements knowing they were false, or with reckless disregard of whether they were false, and with express malice. They knew that Plaintiff held the February 11, 2026 order; that J.J. had lawfully lived with her in Florida; that the August 12 order stated in print that it expired on September 2, 2026, unless extended by court order; and, on information and belief, that J.J. had been taken out of Florida before any order allowed it. Their purpose was to have Plaintiff's reports closed and to have Plaintiff restrained or charged, and they gathered police

records about her for a sanctions motion and then asked that Plaintiff be ordered to pay for that work.

182. The statements were made voluntarily to law-enforcement officers before any charge. Such statements are only "presumptively qualifiedly privileged," and the privilege is overcome by express malice. *Fridovich v. Fridovich*, 598 So. 2d 65, 69 (Fla. 1992).

183. As a direct result, Plaintiff's report under California Penal Code § 278.5 was closed, her requests for a welfare check on J.J. were refused or their results kept from her, her reputation with the agencies to which she had turned for help was harmed, and she has suffered the harms alleged in Part P.

COUNT VII — 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201: Declaratory judgment (against the Judicial Defendants and the Court Administration Defendants, in their official capacities)

184. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 148.

185. What is alleged in this Count is continuing on the day this amended complaint is filed. J.J. is kept from Plaintiff. She has not been told

where he lives. Her applications are disposed of as alleged in Part O. Both state cases remain pending before the same courts.

186. Two of the acts alleged against Defendant McCurry are not adjudication. Swearing to facts is the act of a witness: in the verified answer he filed on November 9, 2026, he swore that on September 15, 2026 he had "ordered all existing orders extended," and the clerk's minutes of that day record no such order. Altering the clerk's record of what was done is record-keeping: the order of October 15, 2026 provides that "The minute order for September 15, 2026 is corrected," to record a ruling the minutes do not contain. Striking a statement of his own disqualification while answering its facts under oath is the act of a party to that question. Defendant Adams's order of September 23, 2026 was signed as Administrative Family Judge; the assignment of cases among judges is administration, governed by the Chief Judge's assignment order quoted in paragraph 145. Defendants Dolan, Porter and Turner are sued for administration only: the handling of Plaintiff's requests to the Presiding Judge, the Chief Judge's answer to her letters, and

the keeping and service of the court's record. What this Count challenges is the practice described in Part O, not any single ruling.

187. Plaintiff asks the Court to declare that each of the following deprives her of liberty without due process of law, or of the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment:

(a) keeping a child for months from the parent who holds the custody order, on an order made without notice to her, before any evidentiary hearing, and without the determination that state law requires before custody goes to a parent whom a court has found to have committed domestic violence against her;

(b) withholding from that parent, without any finding, the place where her child is living;

(c) disposing of her applications by an entry on the register, with no order signed by a judicial officer, no identification of the judge who ruled, and no reasons;

(d) recording in a later order a ruling as made on an earlier date for which the court's own minutes record none;

(e) a judge striking a statement of his own disqualification while filing his own sworn answer to its facts;

(f) granting one parent's applications without notice to the other while denying the other parent's applications made on notice;

(g) issuing, and continuing to give effect to, a warrant to take a child from his mother's home that was made without notice to her and without hearing her;

(h) a judge assigning to herself the case a parent brought to enforce her custody order against the warrant that judge had issued, and then holding that enforcement in abeyance without a hearing; and

(i) an officer who administers a court, told in writing that a parent's petition to enforce her custody order has not been heard and that the order to appear the statute requires has not issued, declining to use the administrative authority of the office.

188. The injury continues each day and cannot be repaired by money. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law against these Defendants.

COUNT VIII — 42 U.S.C. § 1983: First Amendment retaliation, and Fourth Amendment entry, seizure and search, on the night of September 29–30, 2026 (against Defendants Aigner and Guzman, the Perkins Defendants, and Does 1 through 10)

189. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 148.

190. Plaintiff's reports and sworn complaints to the Lee County Sheriff's Office, the Office of the State Attorney, the Mendocino County District Attorney, the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, between September 3 and September 28, 2026, were petitions to the government for redress of grievances and speech on a matter of public concern, protected by the First Amendment.

191. On September 28, 2026, at 5:31 and 5:32 p.m. Eastern time, Plaintiff sent a sworn criminal complaint against Vincent Hyler and Judith Hyler to the Mendocino County District Attorney, Supplemental Sworn Complaint No. 3 to the State Attorney, and a firearm referral to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, with copies to the Lee County

Sheriff's Office. On September 29, 2026, the Perkins Defendants' office spoke with Defendant Guzman about "a restraining order against Heller" and "criminal charges for false reporting against Heller," and Defendant Guzman undertook to "reach out to Sheriff's office" (entry 194). That evening, deputies of the Lee County Sheriff's Office came to Plaintiff's home. Defendant Aigner, the deputy who had taken J.J. on August 19, whom the Perkins Defendants had subpoenaed and prepared as Vincent Hyler's witness, and who had refused on September 11 to enter J.J. as a missing child, was among them.

192. Defendant Aigner told Plaintiff that the visit was a welfare check about "concerning posts" she could clear up and that he was there to "exonerate" her. On that representation she admitted three deputies into her home and her bedroom. She would not have admitted them had she been told the purpose of the visit. Entry into a home obtained by misrepresenting the purpose of the entry is entry without consent.

193. Plaintiff was then held in a locked patrol car for about two and a half hours, in the cold, before any officer told her the visit was not a welfare check; held for one to two hours more at the Sheriff's investigations building;

made to unlock her telephone, which was searched and has been kept since; questioned before any warning; arrested at 12:51 a.m. on September 30, 2026; booked; held for days; and released on a $75,000 bond with a GPS monitor. Each was a seizure of her person or a search or seizure of her property, without a warrant.

194. There was no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff under section 836.10, Florida Statutes. What was reported to the Sheriff's Office was written in a private session with an application she used as a diary; it was not sent, posted or transmitted to any person; she told Detective Alejo that she owned no firearm and had no intention of carrying out anything she had written; no weapon was found; and on October 26, 2026, the State of Florida declined to file any charge, citing insufficient evidence.

195. The entry, the detention, the search and the arrest followed Plaintiff's sworn complaints by one evening. They were carried out with the deputy whom the other side had made its witness at her door, on the day the other side's lawyer and the District Attorney's investigator had discussed criminal charges against her. Plaintiff's protected petitioning was a

substantial and motivating factor in them, and they would not have occurred but for it.

196. Defendant Aigner, Defendant Guzman and Does 1 through 10 acted under color of state law. The Perkins Defendants acted jointly with them, as alleged in Count II and in paragraphs 102 and 108: their office raised a restraining order and criminal charges against Plaintiff with Defendant Guzman on the day of the arrest; recorded on September 30 and October 1, 2026 its follow-up communications with the "DA and sheriff's office"; and recorded on October 6, 2026 its "receipt and review of incident report from police." Plaintiff identifies the Perkins Defendants' and Defendant Guzman's communications with the Lee County Sheriff's Office on September 29, 2026 as a matter likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).

197. As a direct result, Plaintiff suffered the harms alleged in Part P. Plaintiff will amend to name the responding deputies, and Detective Alejo if the records warrant it, when the Lee County Sheriff's Office produces its records of that night.

VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff asks the Court to enter judgment as follows:

(1) against each Defendant other than the Judicial Defendants and the Court Administration Defendants, jointly and severally as the law allows, compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial;

(2) punitive damages against each individual Defendant and against the Perkins Defendants in an amount to be proven at trial;

(3) against those same Defendants, the costs of this action, and reasonable attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for any counsel who appears for Plaintiff;

(4) pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as allowed by law;

(5) against the Judicial Defendants and the Court Administration Defendants, the declaratory judgment asked for in Count VII, and no money; and

(6) any other relief the Court finds just that does not vacate, modify, or enforce a state-court custody order.

IX. DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff demands a jury trial on all issues so triable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b).

Dated: November 20, 2026



CARLI MICHELLE HELLER
Plaintiff, self-represented
P.O. Box 366326
Bonita Springs, Florida 34136
hellercwp@gmail.com
(410) 507-8198

VERIFICATION

I, Carli Michelle Heller, declare: I am the Plaintiff in this action. I have read this First Amended Verified Complaint. The facts stated in it are true of my own knowledge, except those stated on information and belief, and as to those I believe them to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. 28 U.S.C. § 1746.

Executed on November 20, 2026, at Bonita Springs, Florida.



CARLI MICHELLE HELLER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on November 20, 2026, I served a true copy of this First Amended Verified Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b), on each Defendant listed below who had been served with the summons and original complaint before that date, by the method marked for each:

Defendant Mariano Guzman — served with the summons and original complaint on November 19, 2026, through the Mendocino County District Attorney
c/o Office of the District Attorney, 100 North State Street, Room G-10, Ukiah, California 95482
[X] first-class mail, postage prepaid

Defendant Lieutenant Chapman, Badge No. 1302 — served with the summons and original complaint on November 19, 2026, through the Mendocino County Sheriff's Office
c/o Mendocino County Sheriff's Office, Civil Division, 951 Low Gap Road, Ukiah, California 95482
[X] first-class mail, postage prepaid

Any other Defendant whose service with the summons and original complaint is completed before this filing is docketed
will be served with this First Amended Verified Complaint by first-class mail at the address where served, and a supplemental certificate of service will be filed.

Each Defendant not yet served is being served with the summons and this First Amended Verified Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.

Dated: November 20, 2026



CARLI MICHELLE HELLER
Plaintiff, self-represented
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